To

Commanding Officer.

Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject:

Action off North Coast Guadalcanal, Early Morning of November 13, 1942, report of. (3rd Savo Island Night Action).

References:

- (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920, Arts. 712 and 874(6).
  (b) PacFit Conf. 1tr 24CL-42 of June 21, 1942.
- (c) USJ HELENA Secret Airmailgram 140001 to CTF 67.
- (d) USS HELENA Secret Airmailgram 152121 to CTF 67.
- (e) CTF 67 Secret 151012 to ComSoPac.
- (f) UB3 H\_LEMA Secret Ltr. CL50/Al6-3(005) of Nov. 14. 1942, on sinking of JUNEAU.
  - CTF 67 Sacr t despatch NPM 225 120133.
  - NPM 387 130200.
  - (i) USS HELENA Secret despatch 121610 to Radio Tulagi.
- (1) US3 HILENA Secret despatch 122005 to ComairSoPac.
  (E) UGS HILENA Secret 1tr. CL50/A16-3(004) of Oct. 20, 1942 on Action Night 11-12 Vetcher

Enclosures:

- (A) Track Chart of HELENA.
- (B) Extracts from TBS Log.
- (C) Copy of Report of Lieutenant Roger W. O'Neil, MC-V(G), USNR, senior survivor JUNEAU.
- (D) Copy H.I.ENA BT to B-17 Plane on Nov. 13, 1942.
- (E) Sail George Radar Officer's Report.
- In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report is submitted following the sequence given in enclosure (A) of reference (b).
  - Comments on and summary of outstanding events.

As stated in the HELENA's report of the Night Action off Savo Island on 11-12 October, reference (k) par. 1(1) and 1(5-c), the value of the Sail George Radar cannot be overemphasized. It was invaluable, and was the sole means of keeping the OTO informed of the enemy prior to sight contact. The OTO was informed of the approximate formation, general size of ships (large or small), bearing, distance, course and speed. This information started at about 31,900 yards on true bearing 3100, as is shown in Enclosure (B). It was necessary to send this in voice code via TBS as the flagship was not so equipped with 36 Radar and therefore must rely on outside information. With this invaluable instrument available every possible effort should be made to at least equip flagships with it. U

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An enemy cruiser illuminated this ship by searchlight, simultaneously opening fire, prior to our force commencing fire, two hits doing minor material demage were at once registered. Size of projectile fragments and base plug, height and size of searchlight, and radar image confirm this.

The enemy were very evidently equipped with bombardment ammunition for that mission, or it is believed much greater material damage would have resulted to us. Parts of projectiles recovered on

board this and others of our ships verify this statement.

As the main battery of the HELENA was tracking the target that illuminated it, and was completely ready to open fire with fire control problem solved by radar, our fire was effective at once and large fires with quick sinking resulted. This burning ship illuminated others in this force and greatly assisted the destroyers in directing torpedo fire on major ships. This is the ideal method of Night Illumination.

Four important decisions were involved in this action, and its aftermath, which the commanding officer of this ship had to

make.

When should fire be returned as no orders to "commence firing" had

been received? Just "stand-by to open fire".

This ship had furnished most of the information on the enemy and had a very good picture of them showing our force surrounded on three sides, or soon would be. The enemy was hitting us at once and a delay might be fatal. See reference (k), paragraph 1 (7-b). This was discussed at the preliminary conference with Rear Admiral Callaghan prior to sailing. I opened fire at 0145.

(2) At about 0218 the PORTLAND appeared to be out of control and on questioning reported a torpedo hit jamming her rudder. They asked for a tow at 0231. Should the HELENA stop and do this under the circumstances?

Action was still taking place. The position of our forces was not definitely known. Every effort was being made to close the SAN FRANCISCO. The PORTLAND and JUNEAU had been torpedoed, and from previous observation probably the ATLANTA. Enemy destroyers were in all directions and a grave danger of torpedoing existed. See reference (k) paragraph 1 (7-d). I tried to con-

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tact the OTC by TBS and to find the SAN FRANCISCO visually. After the action described in reference (k), Rear Admiral Scott emphasized the distrability of all remaining forces keeping closed up and assembling for possible further action. (At about 0228 the only ships that would answer on TBS were the O'BANNON and FLETCHER). Returning to the area of the PORTLAND was not considered justified. At 0240 the SAN FRANCISCO was contacted by blinker tube on our port bow and instructed us to take charge. Reference (i) was then sent to Radio Tulagi requesting tow and air coverage for the PORTLAND.

(3) When should the night action be broken off and a retirement started?

At about 0214 while attempting to get the course of the rest of the ships in the force I received no answer. As I knew the PORTLAND was damaged, the ATLANTA appeared to have been hit, the SAN FRANCISCO was known to have been hit, and the JUNHAU was not seen. I called all ships and at about 0226 attempted to assemble what forces remained. Firing then was sporadic and numerous ships were burning. The O'BANNON and FLETCHER only were contacted. Course 092, speed 20 knots and form 18 was given in code by TBS to all ships, and destination Sealark. Soon after this the SAN FRANCISCO was contacted ahead on our port bow headed for Sealark Channel and some idea of her orippled condition was obtained. SAN FRANCISCO asked HELENA to lead her out. This together with the few ships contacted caused my decision to retire with the remaining forces via Sealark Channel, which was done with the aid of the Sail George Radar. The FLETCHER preceded us, and the O'B NEWON joined to the eastward having transited Lengo Channel. At 0420 the STERETT having transited Lengo and being demaged joined near Mura Island at the rendezvous I had given for 0425. At 0455 sighted JUNEAU ahead on the port bow. At 0526 the JUNEAU was directed to join us.

ence (f). Should an attempt have been made to search the area for survivors?

The SAN FRANCISCO and HELENA were screened by the STERETT (damaged) and HETCHER, as the O'BENNON was at about 0815 sent to send reference (j), and it rejoined at 1530. Due to the

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small screen, the crippled condition of the ships, and the devastating nature of the explosion, it was not considered that the risk of further torpedoing was justified. No sound or sight contact was made. The hope that a plane would soon appear was held, as the message sent by the O'BANNON asking for air coverage had been already received by us on the Fox schedule. At 1121 a B-17 did appear and Enclosure (D) was the message transmitted to him for forwarding. This message was acknowledged for by the plane, but apparently not forwarded to Commander South Pacific Force.

### (2-a) Enemy forces:

#1 See NPM NR 205 D/T 120030. #2 See NPM NR 232 D/T 120625. #3 See NPM NR 200 D/T 112345.

#1 Concerning 2 BB or 2 CA.
#2 Concerning 2 CV.
#3 Concerning 5 DD.

See Enclosure (E) for general disposition of enemy.

(2-b) Own formation entered the area via Lengo Channel in battle disposition "Baker One". Order of ships as follows: Column of station units van unit Commander Stokes CUSHING, LAFFEY, STERETT, O'BANNON; Base unit ATLANTA, SAN FRANCISCO, PORTLAND, HELKNA, JUNEAU; Rear unit Captain Tobin AARON WARD, BARTON, MONSSEN, FLETCHER. Distance in yards Destroyers 500, Cruisers 700. Distance between rear and first ship adjacent units 800 yards. (Refer CTG 67.4 despatch 120615 of November).

(2-c) Wind from 120, 9 knots; sea smooth swells from 125; Sky - partly cloudy but clear overhead. Jagged lightning over land areas especially in mountains on Guadalcanal and Florida Island.

(3-a) While our force was steaming on course 280° T, speed 18, in special battle disposition (column with four destroyers leading in column, five cruisers (HELENA fourth cruiser in column), followed by four destroyers), off Guadaleanal between Lunga Point and Cape Esperance, Radar Plot reported a contact at 0124, bearing 312° T, range 27, 100 yards. One or two minutes after this Radar Plot reported that three separate groups of targets were distinguishable, two at 27,000

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yards, and one at 32,000 yards. At about 0130 Radar Plot reported that target course was approximately 134° T, speed 20, Between 0125 and 0130 our course was changed to 000 and speed increased to 20 knots. At about 0135 range to left closest target group was 15,000 yards, bearing 324° T, and tracking gave enemy course 120°, speed 20. According to plotting room at about 0137 we changed course to 315° T and speed to 25 which was directly toward the farthest of the three enemy groups and between the two closest enemy groups.

(3-b) The forward FC radar picked up one target group at about 18,000 yards and in conjunction with radar plot tracked this group. It was the left hand group of the two closest groups of targets. It never appeared to change course or speed. At a range of about 6000 or 7000 yards the Gunnery Officer checked and found that we were not on the left hand ship of this group and by use of "SG" radar shifted to a ship farther to the left in this group. This enemy group passed ahead of and crossed to port of our leading destroyers which had at about 0140 changed course to about 270° T.

() Director I was tracking the target using the Forward FO radar for range and train. Director II was doing likewise. All turrets were loaded and in automatic train and elevation. Director I controlling in train, Director III in elevation. At about 0148 we were illuminated by a searchlight bearing about 2850 relative and exactly in line with the train of Director I. Commence firing was ordered immediately and the main battery opened fire in continuous fire at a range of about 4200 yards. Rapid continuous fire was maintained for about two minutes using a 200 yard rocking ladder. Almost at the same time that we opened fire we started our turn to the left following in column the ships ahead which had changed course to about The searchlight on the target (which appeared too high and large to be on a destroyer) was immediately turned off or shot away. Spot I reports that the target was visible to him, that our tracers appeared to be perfect in deflection and that practically all of our shots appeared to hit, and that before cease firing the target was afire forward and amidships and was sinking. Cease firing was given as ordered by Task Force Commander and Commanding Officer after about two minutes of firing at which time the range was about 3000 yards. At about the moment of opening fire on this target a large and compact salvo was seen to hit directly in our wake and 50 to 100 yards

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astern. During this firing we received two hits in the vicinity of the stacks and searchlight tower, one of which has been definitely determined to have been eight inch. It is also probable that the hit we received on the airplane crane was received at this time. It is believed that our target was an eight inch cruiser and that it was sunk. Two destroyers, the O'BANNON and the FLETCHER, both report that it was a cruiser and both report seeing it sink. Its burning silhouetted a BB target for the O'BANNON.

(3-d) The forward Fox Dog picked up the target at about the same time as the Fox Cast and tracked a target ship in the same group obtaining the same enemy course and speed as did the main battery. The 5" battery was in automatic using radar train. Upon opening fire the 5" was on a target slightly to the left of the main battery target and at a range of 6200 yards. The director control officer and spotter reports seeing hits on this target. The 5" battery ceased firing at the same time as the main battery.

(3-e) During this first phase of the action the main battery expended about 175 rounds, the 5" battery about 20 rounds.

(3-f) The succeeding few minutes were mostly absorbed in avoiding damaged ships and identifying own vessels on most of which before challenging the batteries were trained. During this period we almost remmed but managed to avoid by about 100 yards a large capsized vessel bottoms up, the beam of which I am certain was greater than that of this vessel. (It appeared to the Gunnery Officer just like the OKLA-HOMA did on December 7th at Pearl Harbor). Within about 2000 yards of this a vessel with outlines aft generally similar to that of the SAN FRANCISCO was burning fiercely and completely from bow to stern. It was at first thought to be the SAN TRANCISCO but the SAN TRANCISCO was then sighted nearby and definitely identified. With both in sight it was obvious that the burning vessel was definitely larger than the SAN FRANCISCO. It is not considered possible that the burning vessel could have survived as it was already well down. During this period there was considerable firing between vessels mostly to the southwestward. Also during this period we narrowly avoided being rammed on the starboard side by the ATLANTA or JUNEAU. (It is believed to have been the ATLANTA.

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(3-g) At about 0203 radar plot reported at least six enemy ships on our starboard hand heading in northerly direction. While putting the main battery on one of these targets one was observed to be firing on the SAN FRANCISCO then on our starboard bow. Both FC radars got on this target and at 0204 opened fire with the main battery in full automatic using forward FC radar in train. Opening range was 3800 yards. Fired for approximately 12 to 2 minutes and ceased firing at range of 9400 yards when SAN FRANCISCO on our starboard hand came in line of fire. Approximately 125 rounds were expended in this phase and were believed to be very effective.

(3-h) At the same time the 5" battery was getting on the enemy ships to starboard as coached by radar plot it picked up a destroyer on our starboard quarter firing at us and opened fire on it at a range of 7200 yards. About 40 rounds were fired and cease firing ordered when the SAN FRANCISCO came into line of fire, this fire was also most effective.

(3-1) During the above firing of the main and 5" batteries the automatic weapons control officer observed between the lines of fire of the other batteries and at about 3000 yards, a vessel with four stacks passing on diverging course. Fire was opened with the forward starboard 40 MM mount on this vessel and 159 rounds expended. This firing was very effective being directly in the bridge area, and at least 2/3 were seen to hit. Cease firing was ordered at the same time as the other batteries. During this phase of the action two hits were received, one on the face plate of turret four and one on the forecastle deck by a large projectile.

(3-j) Results of the above firing in the second phase are not definitely known but both spotters report that hits were being obtained and it is believed both main battery and 5" targets were on fire. The automatic weapons control officer reports observing about two thirds of all shots fired hitting in the area of the forward stack and bridge structure.

(3-k) After clearing several of own vessels the main battery again opened fire on a vessel of the same group as before. The opening range was 16,400 yards, target course 330, speed 17. It had been tracked out from about 10,000 yards by radar plot and the main battery and FC radars. Rapid continuous fire was maintained for about one

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minute at a very high rate of fire when the range was again fouled and cease firing given. About 60 rounds were fired. The target appeared to be on fire.

(3-1) At about the same time during this third phase the 5" battery fired about 40 rounds at a target believed to be a destroyer just forward of starboard beam at a range of about 5000 yards. Cease firing was ordered when the range was fouled by own vessel. This target also appeared to be in flames.

## TIME SCHEDULE - NIGHT ACTION

Task Group 67.4 - Early morning November 13, 1942. (All times Love). Times and data collected from Quartermaster's Log, Signal Log, and TBS Log kept by Navigation detail.

TIME	EVENT	£
	November 12, 1942	
2214	Changed course to right to 270° T.	
2218	Changed speed to 18 knots (187 rpm).	
2236	Changed speed to 15 knots (155 rpm).	
	November 13, 1942	
0010	Changed course to left to 180° T.	
0013	Changed course to right.	
0024	Changed course to right to 280° T.	
0040	Changed course to left to 270° T.	
0108	Changed course to right to 2500 Te	
0122	Changed speed to 18 knots (187 rpm).	
0124	Radar contact (SG Radar) bearing 3120 T, distance 27,100 yards.	
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- Radar contact (SG Radar) bearing 310° T, distance 31,900 yards. (Note above two contacts appeared to be several large ships with screen).
- Ol35 Changed course to right to 310° T.
- Ol37 Changed speed to 20 knots (208 rpm).
- 0138 HELENA steering 315° T, speed 10 knots.
- 0139 Four targets on port bow. HELENA course 3150 T, speed 10 knots.
- Ol40 Changed speed to 18 knots (187 rpm).
- Ol41 Leading destroyer reported seeing ships dead ahead and on port bow.
  - Ol42 Changed course to right to 000° T.
- 0143 HELENA making 18 knots.
- 0143.5 Leading destroyer told to fire torpedoes.
- 0145 Prepared to open fire. HELENA course 0150 T.
- 0146 HELENA course 010, T.
- 0147 HELENA course 000 T.
- Commenced firing. Opening range 4300 yards. Fired on furthest target to left. Fired two or more minutes after target illuminated ship and hit our searchlight platform. (Clock in D/F shack stopped at 0148).
- O149 Changed course to left. Hard left rudder.
- Ol49 Changed speed to flank (Maximum speed).
- 0150 HELENA stopped all engines.
- 0151 HILENA increased speed to maximum.

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0152 HELENA swinging past 250° T.

O153 Changed course to right to 000° T. Rudder hard right - own course 000° T. Speed 17 knots.

0153 Ceased firing.

Ol54 Changed speed to full (18 knots).

Ol55 Large explosion (off port bow). Considered target fired at by HELENA and sunk.

0156 Planes reported overhead (1) 355° T.

Ol57 Hard right rudder to avoid ship which passed from starboard to port at right angles. Ship either ATLANTA or JUNEAU. (Believed ATLANTA). Very close call.

Ol58 Changed course to 000° T.

Ol59 More gunfire reported (Where?).

0200 Ship ahead of HELENA illuminating.

0201 Heavy cruiser (believed PORTLAND) turning to right.

0202 Large explosion to starboard.

O203 Changed course to left to 290° T. Hilling making 16 knots.

0204 Commenced firing. Opened fire at range 9200 yards.

0206 Ceased firing.

0206.5 "6 enemy ships over 5000 yards on starboard side."

O207 Changed course to left. Hard left rudder. HULENA making 20 knots.

O210 Changed course to right. JUNEAU or ATLINTA (believe ATLANTA) on fire on starboard beam (by 160°T).

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0211 Changed course to left to 120° T. HELENA making 15	left to 120° T. HELENA making 15 knots.	to	left	to	евтиоэ	Changed	0211
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- 0212 "Enemy cruiser on starboard bow."
  - 0213 Hard right rudder.
  - 0214 Took position astern of PORTLAND(?).
- Commenced firing. Haland on course 115° T. "Hard right rudder".

  Opened fire at 16,300 yards bearing approximately 110° rel.

  Enemy course 330° T. Enemy speed 17.
  - 0216 Ceased firing; changed course to right to 230° T.
    HILENA making 10 knots.
  - O217 Changed course to left to 0920 T.
    HELENA increased speed to full.
- 0218 PORTLAND lost steering control.
  - 0220 HELENA making 18 knots.
  - 0221 HELENA steering course 0920 T.
- 0224 HELENA illuminated by searchlight.
  - 0226 Changed speed to flank (28 knots).
  - 0227 Small boat reported off starboard bow.
  - 0230 Changed course to left to 090° T.
- ✓ 0231 Received message from PORTLAND requesting tow.
  - 0232 HELENA on course 050° T.
  - 0234 H.LENA on course 090° T.
  - 0237 HELENA on course 100°, speed 27 knots.
  - 0238 Changed speed to 17 knots.

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0239 HELENA making 20 knots on course 090° T.

0240 SAN FRANCISCO on port bow.

0240 SAN FRANCISCO told this vessel to take charge.

0244 Changed course to right to 100° T.

0249 Changed speed to 25 knots.

O255 Changed course to left to 180° T. HELENA making 20 knots.

0259 Changed speed to 15 kmots.

0300 Changed course to 0900 T. Speed 10 knots.

0301 Changed speed to 20 knots. HMLENA on course 090 T.

0302 Changed right to 098 T.

0307 Changed speed to 10 knots.

0310 HELENA on course 098° T. Speed 15 knots.

O312 Changed speed to 15 knots. Large explosion bearing about

2780 T.

0318 Changed course left to 075° T.

0321 Changed course right to 080° T.

0325 Changed course right to 090 T.

0332 Changed course left to 0810 T.

0344 Changed speed to full (20 knots).

0345 Passed clear of Sealark Channel.

0354 Changed course right to 110° T.

0422 Changed speed to 15 knots.

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0430 Changed course to 1350 T. 0432 Changed speed to 20 knots. 0458 Changed course to 100° T. 0520 Changed course to 1450 T. 0523 Changed course to 130° T.

(4-a) Reference (e) gives an estimate of enemy forces involved and their losses. Three groups definitely existed as shown by Inclosure (D). The center group appeared as four or five large ships (BB's, CA's or Battle Cruisers) and perhaps two transports or smaller ships a distance astern. The left (nearest) and right hand groups contained from five to eight ships each, and were in the nature of a screen having destroyers and two or more cruisers in each.

(4-d) Illuminated and opened fire before we did. Only searchlight noted was the first one opening on the HELENA. It soon went out or was turned off. Starshells and possibly flares were in the sky. Enemy planes were overhead and may have dropped flares. Some of our destroyers and the SAN FRANCISCO are known to have fired starshells which appeared well placed.

Bombardment ammunition used by the enemy is believed to

have reduced their effectiveness.

(4-e) See reference (e) and RDO Guadalcanal NPM 416 - 130428.

(5-a)(1) Performance of the batteries. The performance of all batteries is considered to have been excellent. There were no material casualties which in any way affected the firing except two and possibly three misfires in turret one, both of which were immediately fired by percussion, and the failure of the center gun of turret four to return to battery after a hit sustained on the face plate of that turret. Fire was continued by the wing guns of this turret. Damage to search lights resulted in one light being put out of commission and one operative by local control only. However there was never any need for the use of searchlights. Damage to wiring to forward FC antenna level control did not affect the operation of the radar since automatic level

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was not being used during the action.

throughout the action due to rapid and frequent maneuvers and close proximity of own vessels which frequently blanketed line of fire. Ther was also the necessity frequently to point the batteries on ships believed to be our own as a precautionary measure before attempting to identify by challenge or recognition. The fire discipline maintained throughout was most gratifying and there is complete confidence felt that at no time was a friendly ship fired upon. In the opinion of the function of this action has again denonstrated that with our prescunding officer this action has again denonstrated that with our prescunding ship fired upon. In the opinion of the same equipment illumination of the target by searchlight or star shell is not necessary and that the use of searchlights serves to draw enemy fire.

(5-b) The effectiveness of the radar installation and its performance cannot be praised too highly. Everything said in reference (k) was doubly confirmed again in this Night Action.

(5-c) Summary of damage - location, cause, effect. (Include photographs.

Five hits were sustained during the engagement, details as follows: (Hits numbered from forward aft).

No. 1. - One major caliber (assumed to be 14 inch) hit waterway lip frame 29 and maindeck over pyrotechnic locker and officers' suitcase room. The shell presumably exploded after hitting deck, scattering fragments over face of No. 1 turret, which was pointing about 150° relative, and various deck fittings. The wooden deck was splintered 8' x across run of deck planking. The steel deck was torn and folded 4' across run of deck planking. The steel deck was torn and folded down 6' x lg'. Watertight bulkhead, frame 27, starboard, upper quarte torn out and cracked.

The pyrotechnic locker sprinkling system broken.

Number one turret gas seal punctured over an arc of about 6 degrees (about 25 feet) by fragments. Although fragments punctured at intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees rather than intervals repairs should include entire arc of

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Effect: Rendered pyrotechnic locker untenable as such; dumped small remaining supply of pyrotechnics overboard. Turret one continued firing without difficulty.

No. 2 - Hit on port forward part of forward stack, penetrating, and exploding while going through after part, tearing out a section of the steem exhaust pipe and diesel exhaust pipe. Fragments also damaged the searchlight platform as follows:

Radio Direction Finder loop punctured.

Power cable FE-176-DC feeder to #4 searchlight punctured.

Vantilating motors of #1 and 4 36" searchlights slightly damaged.

Lenses on #2 and 3 searchlights cracked.

Various lighting boxes and cable destroyed.

Searchlight control cable GH-32 partly damaged. Individual leads may be spliced to repair.

Various holes in searchlight platform, and radio direction finder.

Effect: Broke #4 searchlight power supply. Broke remote controls of #2 and 3 searchlights. Rendered Radio direction finder usless.

No. 3 - Major caliber hit (assumed 3" or larger) in port after legs of searchlight platform. Angle bar supporting #2 40 MM director stand torn away. After stack punctured by fragments. One piece, base plug of shell, pierced stack and hit starboard forward section of secondary conn tearing out a section about 12" long and 5" wide. The fragment hit the steering control stand, puncturing the case and breaking electrical leads. Port boat crane structure pierced by numerous fragments; wire cable broken by fragment. #1 motor launch and #1 motor whaleboat hulls punctured. The two stack guys from the after stack leading forward were cut and broken by fragments. The port forward mainmast guy was likewise broken.

Effect: Rendered two boats useless until patched; boat crane out of commission. Secondary conn steering telegraph and rudder angle indicator useless.

No. 4 - Hit on face place of turnet four, 9 inches directly below center gun port. At the point of impact the face plate is dished in 11/64 inch; area of dished surface about 12 inches in diameter. On back of

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face plate a crack 4 inches long has been noted 51 inches above point of impact. Paint cracked and weld apparently broken around entire periphery of face plate both inside and out (water leaking through gives evidence of such a crack). Securing weld cracked on bolts holding angle iron to face plate on inside under center gun. Rivets sesuring face plate to top of turret appear to be loose. The gas seal protector guard demolished throughout are subtended by face plate (about 5 feet). Gas seal itself twisted and torn. Three gun bloomers demolished and retaining rims twisted and torn. Humerous deck fittings such as ventilator cowls and #3 20 MM gun gunshield pierced by fragments. Three fire hoses out up by fragments.

Effect: Other than damage to guns, no effect other than dight inconvenience caused by hit. Turret face plate damage may, in time, be serious but does not impair military efficiency at present.

No. 5 - A section of the starboard brace of aviation crane pierced by direct hit of 5 to 8 inch shell. Shell exploded after hitting; no fragmentation damage.

Effect: Rendered aviation crane useless.

#### Damage sustained to guns during action.

- 1. 6"/47 cal. Gun No. 10. Lower side of chase, five minor gouges about half inch diameter, maximum depth .062 inches.
- 2. 6"/47 cal. Gun No. 11. Lower side of chase, eight gouges over area ten by thirteen inches, depths wary .125 to .375 inches.
- 6"/47 cal. Gun No. 12. Lower side of chase, twelve superficial gouges plus three of about one inch diameter, maximum depth .125 inches.
- 6"/47 cal. Non No. 3. Lower side of chase, two gouges, each about one inch diameter, depths .125 inches.
- 5. 54/38 cal. Gun No. 1.

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Action off North Coast Guadalcanal, Early Morning of november 13, 1942, report of. (3rd Savo Island Night Action). (continued).

One gouge 100 inches from muzzle, i inch by 21 inch, depth .375 inch.

- Face plate turret four dented about two feet below center gun, 6. dent about 3 inch diameter. Maximum depth about .125 inches.
- Slide bushing 6"/47 Gun No. 11 deeply scored and grooved on **7.** recoil subsequent to gouging of gun.
  - (5-d) The following casualties incurred as a result of action:
    - (a) Number killed (b) Number requiring hospitalization (stretcher) 2 (c) Number remaining on board for treatment 20

total casualties 23

Once more the performance of all officers and men has been magnificent and inspiring without exception. Of particular noteshould be the most courageous performance of our searchlight crews, many of whom, though wounded, stayed at their stations and maintained their lights ready for instant use. Several men of the 40 MM crews, though wounded, did likewise. Following the hit on turret four a small fire was started among life jackets, etc, at No. 7 20 MM mount. ROBINSON, E.C., ACMM, USN, and MULLER, P.L., AMAIC, USN, proceeded to the spot and extinguished the fire although turnet four was at the time trained out over this mount ready to fire. The steersman STEWART, E.L., Mic, USN, has performed in exemplary fashion in both the Night Action of 11-12 October and 12-13 November, being of enormous assistance in conning the ship under most difficult conditions while under fire at night.

The following officers are especially worthy of commendation for their performance of duty during this and the previous Night Action of 11-12 October:

Lieut. Comdr. Elmer C. Buerkle, USN - Ship's Material Officer

Lieut. Comdr. Rodmon D. Smith, USN: - Gunnery Officer.

Lieut. Comdr. Charles L. Carpenter, USN. - Navigator.

Lieut. Comdr. John L. Chew, USN. - Assistant Gunnery Officer.

Michael T. Tyng, USN - Communication Officer. Russell W. Gash, UDNR - Radar Officer. Lieutenant

Lieut. (jg)

Lieut. (jg) William D. Fisher, USHR - Signal Officer.

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There are probably many more instances of exemplary action on the part of our personnel and the above is indicative of the performance of the entire crew.

(7) Attention is invited to reference (k) paragraph 7. Every statement made in this paragraph was confirmed in this action. Commenting by paragraphs as used in the reference.

(a) The first enemy ship opened a searchlight and was \ hit and destroyed.

(b) The HELENA faced the decision as to opening fire,

(c) Fully confirmed as SAN FRANCISCO was again flagship and had no 3.G. Radar.

(d) Ships were injured and no instructions to those as-

tern furnished or possible.

(e) Fighting lights were again used. The S.N FRANCISCO and STERETT (and perhaps others) had both lights and TBS shot away at once, and again how establish identity? It was finally done by challenge and blinker.

GILBERT C. HOOVER

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