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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA

Randall Godfrey, Jr., an individual, Plaintiff, v. Arizona Board of Regents, a body corporate, for and on the behalf of The University of Arizona; and National Collegiate Athletic Association, an unincorporated association, Defendants.	Case No. C20268537 **PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST DEFENDANT NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION** (Assigned to the Hon. Jeffrey T. Bergin) (Expedited Ruling Requested)

Plaintiff Randall Godfrey, Jr. applies under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 65 for a temporary restraining order and moves for a preliminary injunction against Defendant National Collegiate Athletic Association (the "NCAA"). This Application is supported by the First Amended Verified Complaint ("FAC"), the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the exhibits identified below, and the record, including the Joint Stipulation of Facts ("Stip.") and the evidence received at the November 17, 2026 hearing. The FAC names the NCAA as a defendant and continues Defendant Arizona Board of Regents, for and on behalf of the University of Arizona, as a party. Godfrey seeks relief against the NCAA on the same legal and factual grounds on which the Court entered its

November 17, 2026 Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, and asks that the Order remain in full force and effect as to Arizona. Godfrey requests a temporary restraining order now and a preliminary-injunction hearing thereafter.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION

On November 17, 2026, this Court found that Godfrey is likely to succeed on his claim that Bylaw 12.6 of the NCAA Division I Manual makes him eligible for the 2026-27 season, and ordered the University of Arizona ("Arizona") to certify him immediately. Ex. A (the "Order"). The next day, the NCAA told Arizona that Godfrey "is not eligible," that "there is no basis for reinstatement or any other eligibility relief for the NCAA to consider," and that "[i]f Arizona permits Godfrey to compete, it does so at its own risk." Ex. B. The NCAA has told courts that certifying eligibility is the member school's job, not the NCAA's. The first time a school was ordered to do that job, the NCAA threatened it. On November 19, the Court denied Godfrey's motion to enforce the Order against Arizona. Ex. J. The Court explained that the Order was "deliberately limited" to Bylaw 12.6, that Godfrey's former agent relationship and all-star game participation are "separate potential grounds affecting certification" the Order did not decide, and that "much of Plaintiff's frustration appears to stem not from actions taken by Defendant, but from the continued inaction of the non-party NCAA." *Id.* at 1–2. Godfrey has therefore amended his complaint to assert claims against the NCAA directly, and he now seeks relief against the party responsible for that inaction.

The relief Godfrey seeks is narrow and respects the line the Court drew. Godfrey does not ask the Court to decide the agent and all-star matters at this time. Arizona has asked the NCAA to decide them through a formal reinstatement request, Ex. I, and the NCAA has refused to consider that request on the Bylaw 12.6 ground this Court has rejected, Ex. B. The NCAA should be (1) enjoined from treating Godfrey as ineligible on that Bylaw 12.6 ground; (2) required to decide Arizona's pending reinstatement request

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on its merits, within 24 hours, and without regard to its position that Godfrey exhausted his eligibility; and (3) enjoined from penalizing Arizona, its coaches, its opponents, or Godfrey under the Rule of Restitution or otherwise for complying with this Court's orders. If the NCAA does not grant Arizona's request, Godfrey reserves the right to return to this Court for further relief on the agent and all-star matters prior to Arizona's November 23, 2026 game in Maui, Hawaii. When the Court entered the Order, it found the threat of NCAA sanctions "hypothetical and speculative." Order at 7. The NCAA has now made that threat concrete. An order directed to the NCAA is the way to remove it.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court is familiar with the record, which is summarized in the FAC and the Joint Stipulation. Godfrey first enrolled full time in college in 2022, competed in four seasons, and is enrolled at and rostered by Arizona for 2026-27. Stip. ¶¶ 24–26, 32. Arizona stipulated that it did not certify Godfrey "because of the NCAA's determination and the risk that the NCAA will impose penalties on Arizona if it permits him to compete, including under Bylaw 12.9.4.2 (Restitution)." *Id.* ¶ 21. It stipulated that Godfrey's agent agreement and all-star game participation occurred "while the NCAA treated Mr. Godfrey as having exhausted his eligibility," that he has terminated the agent relationship and repaid all benefits, and that he was not paid for the all-star game. *Id.* ¶ 23. Godfrey testified at the November 17 hearing that he would not have hired an agent or played in the all-star game had he known he had another year of eligibility. Arizona stated that it would certify Godfrey under any injunction "once he has been reinstated by the NCAA in connection with his former agent and all-star game participation," *id.* ¶ 38, and that it "will promptly submit and support any reinstatement request the NCAA requires," *id.* ¶ 23.

Arizona has done so. By November 16, it had filed a formal reinstatement request with the NCAA and asked for expedited review. Ex. I at 1–2. Arizona told the NCAA that "[a]ll violations took place when RJ firmly believed that he did not have any NCAA eligibility remaining," that "[t]here was no intent to violate any NCAA rules," and that "when the NCAA put out their guidance regarding the new age-based eligibility model,

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RJ was told that his class was not covered under the new model. As a result, RJ hired an agent to go through the NBA draft process." *Id.* at 4, 6. It reported that Godfrey had repaid his expenses, ended the agent relationship before enrolling, and "has already served a withholding penalty of 3 foreign tour games, 3 exhibition games, and 4 regular season games." *Id.* at 4, 6. And it asked "that RJ be reinstated formally by the NCAA." *Id.* at 6.

After this Court entered the Order, Arizona asked the NCAA about Godfrey's eligibility. The NCAA, through its outside counsel, responded on November 18 that Godfrey "is not eligible to compete in NCAA Division I basketball and is not entitled to, or subject to, any relief from the court as against the NCAA"; that, "[b]ecause Godfrey has exhausted his eligibility and the Age-Based Eligibility Rule does not apply to him, there is no basis for reinstatement or any other eligibility relief for the NCAA to consider"; and that "[i]f Arizona permits Godfrey to compete, it does so at its own risk." Ex. B. The NCAA wrote that there was "no basis for reinstatement . . . to consider" while Arizona's reinstatement request was pending before it. Ex. I. The email said Godfrey's Georgia case "remains on appeal." *Id.* It did not mention that Godfrey dismissed his claims in that case on October 27, 2026. Ex. C. Nor did it mention that, eight days earlier, the NCAA had asked the Court of Appeals of Georgia to declare Godfrey's dismissal a "nullit[y]," to hold that he "remain[s a] part[y]" to the Georgia action, and to order him to "immediately dismiss" every other pending action—naming this one. Ex. G at 1–3, 20–21. Two days later, it filed a supplement asking for that injunction "immediately," because an injunction "is enforceable by contempt." Ex. H at 1, 5–6, 8. On November 19, 2026, that court denied both the motion and the supplement. *NCAA v. Godfrey*, No. A27A0375 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2026) (Ex. F). Godfrey's Georgia dismissal stands, he has no claim pending against the NCAA anywhere else, and no court has restrained him from proceeding here. Godfrey did not play in Arizona's November 18 game against the University of Connecticut. On November 19, the Court denied Godfrey's November 18 Emergency Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction, holding that the Order "required certification only with respect to Plaintiff's eligibility under Bylaw 12.6" and "did not resolve any other eligibility issues."

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Ex. J at 2. Arizona has not certified Godfrey, and the NCAA has not acted on Arizona's reinstatement request. Arizona plays Colorado State in the Maui Invitational on Monday, November 23.

The NCAA's threat contradicts the position it has taken in court. Under the Manual, "[a]n active member is responsible for certifying the eligibility of student-athletes under the terms of the bylaws." Bylaw 20.2.4.4; *see* Bylaws 12.1.1.1.2.1, 12.8.1. Arizona stipulated that the responsibility is its own, Stip. ¶ 6, and this Court so found, Order at 3. The NCAA has relied on that same allocation in Class of 2022 cases across the country, telling courts that member institutions, not the NCAA, certify eligibility. *See, e.g.*, Ex. K, *Hudson v. NCAA*, No. DC-26-16417-C (68th Dist. Ct., Dallas Cnty., Tex. Sept. 11, 2026), Hr'g Tr. at 76:15–17 (NCAA counsel: "post-enrollment institutions certify student athletes' eligibility, the NCAA doesn't"). The same NCAA counsel explained that if, and only if, a school determined a rule resulting in potential ineligibility, the school "would have to apply for his reinstatement." *Id.* at 76:21–24. Arizona did exactly that. Ex. I. It described this very case to the Georgia Court of Appeals as one "seeking an injunction requiring the University of Arizona to certify him as eligible." Ex. G at 9. Yet less than twenty-four hours after this Court ordered Arizona to certify Godfrey, the NCAA told Arizona that doing so would be "at its own risk." Ex. B.

III. ARGUMENT

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish "(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury if the relief is denied, (3) that the balance of hardships favors the moving party, and (4) that public policy supports issuance of the injunction." Order at 2–3 (citing *Shinn v. Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency*, 254 Ariz. 255, ¶ 14 (2022)). Under Arizona's sliding scale, the movant may instead show "the presence of serious questions" and that "the balance of hardships tip[s] sharply" in its favor. *Shoen v. Shoen*, 167 Ariz. 58, 63, 804 P.2d 787, 792 (App. 1990).

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A. Godfrey Is Likely to Succeed on His Claims Against the NCAA.

1. This Court has already decided the core question.

The Court has found that the Manual "functions as a contractual framework governing the relationship between the NCAA and its member institutions," that the eligibility bylaws exist "to determine which student-athletes may compete in intercollegiate athletics and under what conditions," and that Godfrey is therefore likely an intended third-party beneficiary. Order at 3–4. It has found that "[n]othing in the text" of Bylaw 12.6 "limits its application to future enrollees," "excludes student-athletes who enrolled before August 1, 2023," or "creates a grandfathering provision," and that the Court may not rely on "informal directives, explanatory statements, press releases, or post hoc interpretations to alter the meaning of an otherwise unambiguous contractual provision." *Id.* at 5 (citing *Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 175 Ariz. 148, 154, 854 P.2d 1134, 1140 (1993)). Those findings apply with equal force to the NCAA, which is a party to the same contract and is bound by the same text. And the Manual itself requires that any "modification of wording shall be codified in the legislation." Bylaw 9.3.1.1. The purported exclusion never was.

The District of Idaho reached the same conclusions last week in a contested proceeding against the NCAA. It held that "the Division I Manual, including its Constitution and Bylaws, constitutes a valid, enforceable contract among the NCAA and its member institutions," describing the NCAA's contrary position this way: "Generously, the NCAA's argument is made half-heartedly and lacks coherent rationale." *Helms v. NCAA*, No. 1:26-cv-00568-DCN, Mem. Decision at 18 (D. Idaho Nov. 12, 2026) (Dkt. 43) (Ex. D). And it held: "Even if the NCAA was clear in its intent to exclude Plaintiffs and others in their situation from benefitting from the new Five-in-Five Rule, the rule that was ultimately adopted does no such thing." *Id.* at 21. More than sixty courts have entered orders permitting Class of 2022 athletes to compete. Stip. ¶ 35.

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2. The NCAA must decide Arizona's reinstatement request rather than refuse it on the ground this Court has rejected.

The Order resolved Bylaw 12.6. As the Court explained in denying the motion to enforce, Godfrey's former agent relationship and all-star game participation are "separate potential grounds affecting certification" that the Order did not address. Ex. J at 1. Under the Manual, those matters are for the NCAA's reinstatement process in the first instance, and Arizona has invoked it. Ex. I. That is the process the NCAA itself has described to courts: when a school's eligibility determination raises an issue, the school "would have to apply for his reinstatement." Ex. K at 76:23–24. But the NCAA has refused to consider those matters at all, "[b]ecause Godfrey has exhausted his eligibility." Ex. B. That is the interpretation this Court found Godfrey likely to defeat. The NCAA did not say that the agent or all-star matters would independently bar him; it said it would not look. Godfrey does not ask this Court to decide the reinstatement request. He asks the Court to require the NCAA to decide it, on its merits before Godfrey's next game, rather than refuse to decide it on a ground this Court has already found likely wrong.

Both matters arose "while the NCAA treated Mr. Godfrey as having exhausted his eligibility." Stip. ¶ 23. Godfrey has terminated the agent relationship, repaid every benefit, and was not paid for the all-star game. *Id.* The Manual provides a process for restoring eligibility when "the circumstances warrant restoration." Bylaws 12.9.1, 12.10.1, 12.10.3. Arizona invoked that process on November 16 and asked for expedited review. Ex. I at 1–2. The NCAA has refused to run it. Arizona, which certified the accuracy of its request under Bylaw 10.1, told the NCAA that the expenses Godfrey received "would have been permissible benefits to receive from an institution if RJ knew that he had eligibility remaining." *Id.* at 4, 8. Nothing about the agent or all-star matters would have arisen had the NCAA applied Bylaw 12.6 as written. A party may not rely on conditions its own breach created to avoid its obligations, and it may not exercise discretion under a contract—including discretion over whether to entertain a reinstatement request—to deprive the other party of the contract's benefits. *Rawlings v. Apodaca*, 151 Ariz. 149,

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153, 726 P.2d 565 (1986) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). The *Helms* court found a likely breach of the covenant on closely related facts, where the NCAA's exclusion of Class of 2022 athletes also cut off the revenue-sharing and endorsement benefits that depend on eligibility:

> The Bylaws provide that member institutions cannot enter into licensing, promotional, or endorsement agreements with a student-athlete beyond that student-athlete's eligibility to compete. *See* Dkt. 20-2, at 188. As discussed above, Bylaw 12.6 does not exclude Plaintiffs from competing a fifth year in cross country and/or track and field. By excluding Plaintiffs from their contractual right to compete, the NCAA has also impaired their ability to benefit from revenue sharing with BSU. Thus, the Court finds the NCAA likely breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Ex. D at 23. Godfrey has "multi-million dollar name-image-likeness opportunities that depend on his eligibility to compete for Arizona." Stip. ¶ 31. The same reasoning applies.

3. The NCAA's cited rulings do not change the analysis.

The NCAA's email relies on two sets of rulings. Neither is an obstacle. The Georgia injunction was stayed pending appeal in a one-paragraph order without analysis, before the 2026-27 Manual was published, and Godfrey has since dismissed his claims there. FAC ¶¶ 13–18; Ex. C. The NCAA then asked the Georgia appellate court to declare that dismissal a nullity and to order Godfrey to dismiss this very case. Ex. G at 1–3, 20–21. When the NCAA pressed for that relief "immediately," Ex. H at 8, the court denied the motion and the supplement. Ex. F. The NCAA has now asked the Georgia courts to keep Godfrey there and stop him from proceeding here, and it lost. Ex. F. The Georgia proceedings therefore provide no basis to deny relief here; they confirm that this is the forum in which Godfrey's claims will be decided. In *Harris v. NCAA*, the trial court denied a preliminary injunction, and the Court of Appeals, applying the standard for a stay, concluded that those plaintiffs "ha[d] not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying contract dispute" and declined special-action jurisdiction. *Harris v. NCAA*, No. 2 CA-SA 2026-0095 (Ariz. App. Nov. 6, 2026) (Ex. E). That was a preliminary assessment, on a different record, of claims by different plaintiffs against the

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NCAA alone. It is not a merits decision, and findings made in ruling on preliminary relief "are not binding at trial on the merits." *Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch*, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). The record here differs in important respects: this Court held an evidentiary hearing; the University, a party to the Manual, stipulated that the Manual is a contract between the NCAA and its members and that Godfrey may enforce Bylaw 12.6 as an intended third-party beneficiary, Stip. ¶ 37; and the NCAA has since refused even to consider Godfrey's eligibility on the ground this Court rejected, Ex. B. On this record, this Court found a strong likelihood of success, as have the courts in *Helms*, *Daley*, *Scalia*, and more than sixty other cases. Stip. ¶ 35.

B. Godfrey Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Without Relief Against the NCAA.

The Court has found that "[a]thletic eligibility is inherently time-sensitive" and that lost games "cannot be recreated by a later judgment." Order at 6. The Court further found that "a final judgment entered after the season would effectively deprive Plaintiff of the very relief he seeks," and that Godfrey "has established a substantial likelihood of irreparable harm absent immediate injunctive relief." *Id.* Those findings apply with equal force to the NCAA, whose refusal to recognize the Order is now the only obstacle to Godfrey's certification. As the *Helms* court put it, "[l]ost opportunities to compete, improve competitive performance, and gain visibility for potential sponsors and professional opportunities cannot be remedied through compensatory damages." Ex. D at 39–40. Arizona stipulated that this is Godfrey's final season, that missed games "cannot be made up later," and that money damages would not compensate him. Stip. ¶ 30. Every remaining game is nationally televised and attended by professional scouts. *Id.* ¶ 29.

Without an order directed to the NCAA, that harm will continue despite the Order. Arizona has stated that it will not certify Godfrey until the NCAA acts, and the NCAA has said it will not act. Stip. ¶ 38; Ex. B. On Monday, November 23, 2026, Arizona plays Colorado State in the Maui Invitational, historically the premier preseason event in college basketball.

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C. The Balance of Hardships and Public Policy Favor Relief.

The NCAA cannot have it both ways. When it is defending against claims, the NCAA tells courts that eligibility certification belongs to the schools. When a school is ordered to certify, the NCAA threatens the school. That is not a good-faith position about who decides eligibility; it is a strategy for ensuring that no court order can ever reach the decision. It leaves athletes like Godfrey with an order that the school will not follow without the NCAA's blessing and an NCAA that disclaims any obligation to the court. An order directed to the NCAA is the only way to close that gap.

The Court found that the burden of compliance on Arizona was "minimal" and that "any threat of sanctions from the NCAA are, at this point, hypothetical and speculative." Order at 7. The NCAA's November 18 email has made that threat concrete, Ex. B, and only an order directed to the NCAA can remove it. The requested order costs the NCAA nothing it is entitled to. It requires the NCAA only to stop enforcing an exclusion its own Manual does not contain, and to refrain from punishing a member institution for complying with a court order. The *Helms* court found the NCAA "would be minimally harmed" if Class of 2022 athletes competed. Ex. D at 40. This Court found that public confidence in intercollegiate athletics "is enhanced when eligibility decisions are made pursuant to the rules actually adopted and published, rather than pursuant to unwritten limitations or alternative interpretations." Order at 7. And the public interest in the authority of court orders is at its height when a non-party tells the enjoined party that compliance will be at its "own risk."

The NCAA itself told the Court of Appeals of Georgia a week ago that "an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings," and "[p]ersons who make private determinations of the law and refuse to obey an order generally risk criminal contempt even if the order is ultimately ruled incorrect." Ex. H at 7 (quoting *In re Beckstrom*, 295 Ga. App. 179, 181 (2008)). The rule is the same everywhere: "[i]f a person to whom a court directs an order believes that order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but, absent a

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stay, he must comply promptly with the order pending appeal." *Maness v. Meyers*, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975); *see Walker v. City of Birmingham*, 388 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1967). The NCAA's November 18 email is precisely a "private determination[] of the law"—that this Court's Order is wrong and that Godfrey is "not entitled to, or subject to, any relief"—announced to the party this Court enjoined. Ex. B. The NCAA should be held to the rule it urged on the Georgia court.

D. The Court Should Enjoin Enforcement of the Rule of Restitution.

The Rule of Restitution authorizes the NCAA to vacate wins, forfeit games, impose postseason bans, and claw back revenue from an institution that permits an athlete to compete under a court order that is later vacated, stayed, or reversed. Stip. ¶ 22; Ex. D at 40 n.20. Courts have recognized its purpose: "The breadth of the Rule of Restitution is staggering and goes well beyond final adjudication on the merits in the NCAA's favor. It is in fact a measure designed to inhibit a person's access to the courts." *Ohio v. NCAA*, 706 F. Supp. 3d 583, 601 (N.D. W. Va. 2023). For that reason, courts routinely enjoin it. *Pavia v. NCAA*, 760 F. Supp. 3d 527, 545 (M.D. Tenn. 2024). The *Helms* court did so because, for a preliminary injunction "to be meaningful, 'the NCAA must be prevented from punishing [Plaintiffs] . . . for obtaining it.'" Ex. D at 41 (quoting *Martinson v. NCAA*, 804 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1133 (D. Nev. 2025)). The NCAA's "at its own risk" warning is that threat. The Court should enjoin it.

E. A Temporary Restraining Order Is Warranted, and No Bond Is Required.

The FAC is verified, and the record already before the Court, including the Joint Stipulation, the evidence received at the November 17 hearing, and the NCAA's own email, clearly shows that Godfrey will suffer immediate and irreparable injury before a full hearing can be held. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Godfrey has provided notice of this Application to the NCAA's counsel by email. No bond is necessary because the NCAA will suffer no cognizable damages. The Court required no bond under Rule 65(c) in its November 17 Order. Order at 9. Ex. D at 41; Stip. ¶ 40.

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IV. RELIEF REQUESTED

Godfrey respectfully requests that the Court enter a temporary restraining order, and after hearing a preliminary injunction, enjoining the NCAA, its officers, agents, employees, and attorneys, and all persons acting in concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order, from:

A. Denying, delaying, refusing, suspending, or revoking Godfrey's eligibility, or declaring or treating Godfrey as ineligible to compete for the University of Arizona during the 2026-27 season on the ground that he competed in four seasons, first enrolled in a collegiate institution in 2022, or exhausted his eligibility under the pre-August 1, 2026 version of NCAA eligibility legislation, or on any interpretation of Bylaw 12.6 inconsistent with the Court's November 17, 2026 Order, provided Godfrey satisfies all other generally applicable eligibility requirements unrelated to the interpretation of Bylaw 12.6;

B. Refusing or failing to consider and decide on the merits, within 24 hours of the Court's order, the University's pending reinstatement request (NCAA Case ID 1280682), and denying or refusing to decide that request or any other request to restore Godfrey's eligibility in connection with his former agent agreement or all-star game participation on the ground that he exhausted his eligibility;

C. Enforcing Bylaw 12.9.4.2 or any other bylaw, or imposing any penalty, against the University of Arizona, its coaches, its student-athletes, its opponents, or Godfrey on account of Godfrey's certification or participation pursuant to this Court's orders; and

D. Communicating to the University of Arizona, or to any conference or member institution, that it will be penalized for complying with this Court's orders.

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Godfrey further requests that the Court confirm that its November 17, 2026 Order remains in full force and effect as to Defendant Arizona Board of Regents, that the temporary restraining order remain in effect until the Court rules on the motion for preliminary injunction or further order of the Court, and that the Court require no bond, and set a preliminary-injunction hearing at the Court's earliest availability.

Godfrey expressly reserves the right to seek further relief from the Court, including a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the NCAA from declaring or treating him as ineligible on account of his former agent agreement or all-star game participation, if the NCAA does not grant Arizona's reinstatement request within 24 hours of the Court's order.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit A: Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Nov. 17, 2026)

Exhibit B: Email from Rakesh Kilaru to Jason Montgomery and Brendan Melander (Nov. 18, 2026, 2:29 p.m.)

Exhibit C: Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, *Godfrey v. NCAA*, No. 26CV05617 (Ga. Super. Ct. Cobb Cnty. Oct. 27, 2026)

Exhibit D: *Helms v. NCAA*, No. 1:26-cv-00568-DCN (D. Idaho Nov. 12, 2026) (Memorandum Decision, Dkt. 43)

Exhibit E: *Harris v. NCAA*, No. 2 CA-SA 2026-0095 (Ariz. App. Nov. 6, 2026) (Order)

Exhibit F: *NCAA v. Godfrey*, No. A27A0375 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2026) (Order Denying Emergency Motion for Declaratory Relief and Anti-Suit Injunction)

Exhibit G: NCAA's Emergency Motion for Declaratory Relief and Anti-Suit Injunction, *NCAA v. Godfrey*, No. A27A0375 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2026) (without appendix)

Exhibit H: NCAA's Supplement to Rule 40(b) Emergency Motion for Declaratory Relief and Anti-Suit Injunction, *NCAA v. Godfrey*, No. A27A0375 (Ga. Ct.

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App. Nov. 12, 2026) (without supplemental appendix)

Exhibit I: University of Arizona, NCAA Student-Athlete Reinstatement Request, Case ID 1280682 (Nov. 16, 2026) (redacted)

Exhibit J: Ruling re: Plaintiff's Emergency Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction (Nov. 19, 2026)

Exhibit K: Excerpts from Reporter's Record, Temporary Injunction Hearing, *Hudson v. NCAA*, No. DC-26-16417-C (68th Dist. Ct., Dallas Cnty., Tex. Sept. 11, 2026) (reporter's caption misdated September 12, 2026)

The Joint Stipulation of Facts (filed Nov. 16, 2026) is already of record.

DATED this 20th day of November 2026.

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FILED via TurboCourt this 20th day of November 2026 with:

Clerk of the Court
Pima County Superior Court

SERVED via TurboCourt this 20th day of November 2026 with:

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