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Red Journalism: The Allegheny Indians, Ben Franklin's *Pennsylvania Gazette*, and the Ethnic Cleansing of Pennsylvania, 1747–1764

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ABSTRACT

Benjamin Franklin "retired" from printing in 1747 but retained ownership of his press and a close working relationship with his printer, and *Pennsylvania Gazette* Editor David Hall. From King George's War in 1747 through the French and Indian War, Assemblyman Franklin used his press and the *Gazette* to forward his political objective of militarizing the Quaker Colony. During the French and Indian War, the *Gazette* pioneered standards of accurate reporting relying on eyewitness accounts, multiple sourcing, and networks of information that other presses imitated. This reporting provides vivid detail of the Allegheny Indians' successful strategy of using terror to influence Pennsylvania to sue for peace on Indian terms in 1758. At the same time, Franklin, Hall, and the *Gazette* moved beyond the reporting of fact and sensationalized Indian violence—not to sell papers but to militarize the colony for self-defense with fortifications, an army, and scalp bounties. The Allegheny Indians and the *Gazette*'s tactics both achieved their intended goals, but also carried the unintended consequence of the ethnic cleansing of Pennsylvania.

KEYWORDS

Benjamin Franklin; French and Indian War; Indians; Pennsylvania; press

"We are Allegheny Indians, and your enemies. You all must die." Shingas, the western Delaware war chief, painted in black from head to toe, made this terrifying announcement to John Conrad Leininger on Oct. 16, 1755. He stood with a handful of warriors in Leininger's home opposite the forks of Pennsylvania's Susquehanna River, across from Shamokin, the eastern Delaware Indian town. They shot Leininger, tomahawked his son, and captured two children before ransacking the cabin, burning everything. Minutes earlier, another war party attacked Jean Jacques Le Roy's farm, killed several, and captured three. The warriors left Le Roy a calling card, two tomahawks buried in his skull, his body upright in a fire, legs scorched off. Shingas achieved total surprise, attacking several farms around George Gabriel's Mill on Penn's Creek. There German, Swiss, and Scotch-Irish settlers had lived peacefully for a decade, side by side, with eastern Delaware, Tutelo, and Seneca neighbors across the river at Shamokin. Famed naturalist John Bartram said of the "Penn's Creek Massacre" that "most of the Indians which are so cruel are such as was almost daily familiar at their [the white settlers'] houses, eate drank & swore together, was even intimate playmates." Bartram was wrong though, as Shingas made clear the raiders were "Allegheny Indians" not Susquehanna, a confederation of western Delawares, Shawnees, and Senecas. After killing fifteen, they took ten captives home to Kittanning

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on the Allegheny River. Their objective was to send terrorized white settlers fleeing from Indian lands back east as refugees and force the Pennsylvania government to come to peace on Indian terms. Since 1681, Pennsylvania Indians had used diplomacy for political ends. Now their means would be warfare, their targets civilians, and terror their tactic.[1]

Days before the "Penn's Creek Massacre," Assemblyman Benjamin Franklin reported to Pennsylvania colonial agent Richard Partridge in London on the state of the "French and Indian War." "Virginians and Marylanders suffered from the Indians, but nothing of that Kind hath happened in our Province ... tho' for my part, I am of the Opinion a Militia ... might be of Use in case of Invasion." Ben Franklin, leader of an anti-proprietary wing of the Quaker Party in the Pennsylvania Assembly and owner of the most prestigious newspaper in the American colonies, had been attempting to militarize the pacifist colony years before the war began.[2] Seventeen months earlier, on May 9, 1754, as tensions between France and Britain were rising, Franklin wrote a long editorial in his *Pennsylvania Gazette*. He urged the colonies to unite in military self-defense against the French and their Indian allies and inserted the first ever American editorial cartoon, the severed snake calling to "JOIN, or DIE," to illustrate his point. This was a direct attempt to shape the public opinion not only of Pennsylvanians, but also of colonists up and down the seaboard, advocating a military union. Franklin's plea to "JOIN, or DIE" (Figure 1) led to the Albany Congress in the autumn of 1754. Franklin's Albany Plan of Union failed, but Pennsylvania Proprietary officials succeeded in securing Iroquois Six Nations' neutrality in exchange for the purchase of lands between the Susquehanna and the Ohio Rivers. The agents for William Penn's heirs did this without the Allegheny Indians presence or consent. One year later, on Oct. 23, 1755, Franklin's *Gazette* reported the Penn's Creek Massacre.[3]

This article will use the *Pennsylvania Gazette* to explore two interrelated and oppositional processes of opinion shaping in colonial Pennsylvania, and their unintended consequences. Shingas's goal was to terrify Pennsylvanians into pushing the Proprietors to the peace table, and to negotiate for themselves the terms and boundaries of the Albany Purchase to preserve their independence. Franklin's goal was to terrify these same



Figure 1. Benjamin Franklin, "Join or Die," May 9, 1754. Benjamin Franklin's warning to the British colonies in America "join or die," exhorting them to unite against the French and the Natives, shows a segmented snake, with initials 65 for colonies including SC, NC, V, M, P, NJ, NY, and NE. Library of Congress digital ID <hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3g05315>.

Pennsylvanians to push the Quaker-dominated Assembly to at last field and fund an army to preserve Pennsylvania security. Shingas's tools were guns and hatchets, while Franklin's were type and ink. Shingas terrorized frontier Pennsylvanians, Franklin and the *Gazette* terrified those around Philadelphia. Moreover, the *Pennsylvania Gazette* demonstrates the nature and success of Allegheny Indian tactics and strategy in the Seven Years War. In addition, examining Franklin's paper reveals that during the war the *Gazette* led the other papers in developing the professional standards of fact-based, verified reporting well before other scholars have dated this development. At the same time, the *Gazette* often went beyond reporting facts, and increasingly tended toward the sensational, the imaginative, and the grotesque. Its owner wanted a string of military forts, an army, an offensive war against the Indians, and a scalp bounty. Franklin would have to bring political pressure against the Quakers in the Assembly to militarize the pacifist colony. To do that, Franklin's *Gazette* engaged in "Red Journalism." Fourteen decades later Pulitzer and Hearst pushed for a war in Cuba to sell papers. Franklin and the *Gazette* were not so crass; he never directed his printer to "furnish" a war to boost circulation. Neither did Franklin have an economic interest in land expansion, nor a monetary benefit in militarization—though it was politically beneficial to him. Franklin wanted Pennsylvania to militarize for security against the Indians and the French—both real threats. Shingas and Franklin each achieved their objectives during Pennsylvania's "First Indian War" between 1755 and 1758, but events spun out of their control thereafter. The Allegheny Indians would go back to war against Pennsylvania in 1763–1764, and Pennsylvanians subsequently drove Indians out of the colony. Pennsylvania became one of the least Indian places in America, the only original state today with no reservation and no federally recognized native groups.[4]

From Plain Truth, to "JOIN, or DIE": Franklin, the *Gazette*, and Militarizing Pennsylvania

Founded by pacifist Quaker proprietor William Penn in 1681, and still governed by Friends-dominated Assembly in 1754, Pennsylvania had never militarized. During the first two "French & Indian Wars," King William's and Queen Anne's Wars between 1689 and 1713, there was no threat of Indian war in Pennsylvania. William Penn was still alive, and his policies demanding fair purchase of Indian lands before settlement still held. In fact, Pennsylvania became a refuge for Indians from other colonies during Penn's lifetime. When Penn died in 1718, his heirs left the Quaker faith and its scruples, and unlike their ancestor defrauded Indians of their lands. The proprietors and their political party in the Governor's Council, and some in the Assembly, favored aggressive land expansion that strained Indian relations. The most egregious case of fraud was the 1737 Walking Purchase, concocted with fraudulent documents and a pre-planned run by trained colonial agents that swindled the Delawares and Munsees out of the Delaware Valley for good. As a result, during the third French and Indian War, King George's War (1744–1748), Pennsylvanians feared their Indian neighbors would join the French (Figure 2). In 1747, Benjamin Franklin, a critic of the Proprietors, "retired" from the printing business by leasing his shop and the *Pennsylvania Gazette* to his protogé David Hall to turn his attention to civic engagement. Through Hall, he published a pamphlet, *Plain Truth*, which called on Pennsylvania to arm its citizens. "We have, 'tis true, had a long Peace with the



Figure 2. Pennsylvania, 1747–1764. Map by Jeremy Shaffer with Andrew Baker, Austin Danel, and Matthew Innes, Department of Geography, University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown.

Indians: But it is a long Peace indeed" and "when ... the French, and their Indians, boldly, and with Impunity, ravage the Frontiers ... Who can, without the utmost horror, conceive the miseries ... when your persons, fortunes, wives and daughters, shall be subject to the wanton and unbridled rage, rapine and lust."[5]

Franklin stoked the imaginations of Quaker Colony readers with images of the enemy's "rage, rapine and lust" on female bodies for political effect. Pennsylvania started as a Quaker haven, but three decades of Anglican, Scotch-Irish Presbyterian, and German Lutheran and Reformed immigration had made Quakers a minority. Most of those new "Churchmen," as Franklin called them (and himself), lived on the frontier in Lancaster County in 1747. Though outnumbering the Quakers, they controlled only two seats in the Assembly compared to eight each for the Quaker dominated counties of Philadelphia, Bucks, and Chester. The numbers were against him for a provincial militia, so Franklin, the private citizen with a printing press, called on Churchmen to join a voluntary military "Association." He enlisted 10,000 men and raised funds to arm them through a lottery. His press printed and sold an entire run of tickets for £20,000 and he used the £3,000 proceeds to purchase cannons, muskets, shot, and powder. By the time Franklin organized and armed the Association, the war had ended, but not Franklin's advocacy for a militarized Pennsylvania.[6]

In 1751, Franklin ran for Assembly and won as an independent, liked by both the Quaker and Proprietary Parties. While peace prevailed, Franklin worked the Assembly and Executive branches for public improvement, drafting charters for the Pennsylvania Hospital and the Academy and College of Philadelphia. But the onset of the Seven Years War gave Franklin, the man in the middle, an opportunity to pursue a colonial militia. Like Franklin, the proprietors and their appointed governors had demanded the Assembly answer the Crown's requests for funding and militarization during the previous two "French and Indian Wars" (including William Penn). Each time the Quaker-led Assembly refused. However, by King George's War, a new generation of Quakers that, while they would refuse military service, might be willing to fund others' desires for self-defense if the proprietors agreed to one demand. William Penn set up his colony in a semi-feudal arrangement. He and his heirs owned the whole place, hence the name Pennsylvania. They "sold" land to buyers but then charged annual quitrents for the right to remain. However, these landholders could vote and they had an Assembly with the powers of the purse and lawmaking. The Assembly chafed for years under the Frame of Government's disposition that withheld proprietary lands from the tax rolls, while all other Pennsylvania landowners paid both quitrents and taxes. This blend of the feudal and the democratic created headaches for the proprietors who owned the colony at the pleasure of the crown. Indeed, in the 1690s King William revoked Pennsylvania's charter for a time for its failure to fund the war that bore his name.[7] The curious mix provided Franklin a wedge.

By 1754, continued immigration of Churchmen led to new frontier counties: York, Cumberland, Berks, and Northampton, each with only two Assemblymen. Even still German and Scotch-Irish immigrants tended to vote Quaker since the Assembly provided them paper money bills to ease indebtedness and keep prices low at land offices. Pennsylvanian's commitment to pacifist politicians worried Franklin as Virginia's Ohio Company pushed toward the French Fort Duquesne with a provincial militia headed by George Washington. To rouse his constituents, and colonists throughout North America to the danger, Franklin published the "JOIN, or DIE" cartoon and an editorial in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*. Like *Plain Truth* in the last war, Franklin's "JOIN, or DIE" rhetoric urged his readers to militarize and moved beyond statements of fact by enjoining them to imagine the horrors that war would bring to a defenseless state. The enemy, Franklin warned, "will murder and scalp our Farmers, with their Wives and Children, and take an easy Possession of ... British Territory."[8]

By the fall, Pennsylvania sent a delegation including Franklin to the Albany Congress that his editorial had promoted. Thanks to Richard Partridge, the Board of Trade called for the assembly, and the military union. Franklin authored the Albany Plan that created an executive authority with powers to raise colonial funds and troops. None of the seven colonial delegations in attendance could agree and the plan fizzled. In addition to Franklin, Pennsylvania sent Assembly Speaker Isaac Norris, and proprietary agent Conrad Weiser. Provincial Secretary Richard Peters charged Weiser with the responsibility to arrange for a purchase of Iroquois lands in Pennsylvania's royal grant—from the Susquehanna River west to the Ohio—in exchange for their neutrality in the coming war. This was a good deal for the Six Nations since they did not own the lands and had never claimed them, and it was a reprise of a tactic used in 1736–37. Then the Pennsylvania Proprietors with Iroquois help swindled the eastern Delawares out of a vast tract of land around the forks of the Lehigh with the infamous Walking Purchase. The

Proprietors used dubious half-century-old documents, an Iroquois deed, and a team of runners instead of walkers. The Allegheny Indians—including many Delawares dispossessed by the Walking Purchase—who lived on the "Albany Purchase" lands were not at the Albany meeting in 1754 and did not consent to or receive payment for the sale. This fraud, witnessed by Franklin, ultimately led to the Allegheny Indians' war of independence in the fall of 1755.[9]

With the political failure of his military union, Franklin once more turned to direct voluntary action. Following Washington's defeat at Fort Necessity, the British sent an army under the command of General Edward Braddock to the Forks of the Ohio in 1755. Imperial officials ordered the colonies to raise money and troops but Quaker Assemblymen blocked Pennsylvania Governor Robert Hunter Morris's military requisitions. Through a correspondence with General Braddock, Franklin determined to act. He used David Hall and his printing press to distribute a broadside calling on Pennsylvanians to lease the army their wagons and teams. Franklin put up £200 of his own money to front the operation and procured 150 wagons and 1,500 horses. This was not enough, as the French and their Indian Allies routed Braddock's forces just a few miles from Fort Duquesne.[10]

Following the French-allied Indians' stunning defeat of Braddock in 1755, Franklin began maneuvers in the Assembly to secure military funding and create a Pennsylvania militia. He represented the rise of eastern Churchmen opposing the Proprietary Party, a role he stepped into with relish when the Governor Morris and proprietor John Penn reacted to his wagon scheme as a grandstanding act of self-promotion. They preferred an Assembly bill to fund Braddock, as the Crown requested. Franklin then led an Anti-Proprietary wing of the Quaker Party and attempted to broker a deal between Quaker Assembly leaders and Proprietary leadership in the Governor's Council. His plan was to exchange proprietary property taxation for Quaker Party military funding and pacifist-excepted militarization. The rise in Assemblymen from the defenseless non-Quaker frontiers, combined with the rise of Churchmen in the east would begin to tip the scale toward Franklin's goal, but conscience men still dominated the Assembly when war finally came to the Quaker Colony.

The *Gazette* and the War: Setting Journalistic Standards

While Franklin was serving in the assembly in 1755, he was still actively involved in the affairs of his printing office and the *Pennsylvania Gazette*. When he turned over the shop to David Hall in 1747, he did so on a twenty-year lease at the end of which Hall could buy all the equipment at a depreciated rate—Franklin was still the owner. He used Hall and his press to advocate for governmental and voluntary militarization. In 1751, Franklin won the position of Deputy-Postmaster for North America. This position sent him travelling to other colonial cities, meeting with other printers, and providing him and his news correspondents with free postage. It was with this "franking privilege" that Franklin would improve the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, and would attract imitations from other colonial newspapers, especially from one in Franklin's hometown, the *Boston Gazette*.[11]

Historians have traditionally credited the *Boston Gazette* with modernizing journalistic techniques beginning with the Stamp Act and heading into the Revolutionary War. David Copeland showed that newspapers began to collaborate and professionalize earlier during the Seven Years War. This process matured after Deputy-Postmaster Franklin waived postage fees in 1758 for all newspaper printers to share information more easily. However,

even this correction is too late, and misses the impact of Franklin and Hall's *Gazette* as the trendsetter. Franklin distributed his essay and cartoon to all ten American newspapers. He even sent provincial agent Richard Partridge in London a copy requesting he get it "inserted in some of your most publick Papers." A scan of the other colonial newspapers in 1754 reveals that over time, every paper printed Franklin's editorial. The *New York Mercury* ran the piece four days afterward on May 13, with the *Boston Gazette* and *Boston News-Letter* following the next week on May 21 and 23. All three papers reprinted Franklin's essay verbatim. Not having his woodcut die for the cartoon, each hurried to create their own facsimile. Franklin's original cartoon intended to illustrate the specific threat he identified in his essay. Indians would terrorize the frontiers of all the colonies, from New England to South Carolina. To remind readers of that point, he made the dismembered snake's tongue in the shape of an arrow. The *Mercury* followed Franklin's convention, but the *Boston Gazette* and *News-Letter* made an editorial change to the snake, collaborating to add to the arrow tongue a spiraling word bubble, reading "Unite and Conquer" above the warning "JOIN, or DIE." New Englanders had battled Indians since the wars of removal since the 1630s. They endured perpetual Indian reprisals during Metacom's, King William's, Queen Anne's, and King George's Wars from 1675–1748. The *Boston Gazette and News-Letter*'s additional call for conquest reflected this long history of Indian wars on their frontier. For historically peaceful Pennsylvania, this would all be new. However, Franklin's *Gazette* led the way.[12]

In both 1755 and 1763, editors Jon Gill and Benjamin Edes reprinted *Pennsylvania Gazette* war stories from the Pennsylvania frontier with great regularity and rapidity in their *Boston Gazette*. Because of the distance between the weeklies, the first opportunity to reprint in the *Boston Gazette* was eleven days later. In the six weeks after the Allegheny Indian attack at Penn's Creek, Gill & Edes reprinted a dozen *Pennsylvania Gazette* war stories verbatim. Two other stories they compiled from Franklin's paper. Each one appeared eleven days after Franklin's edition. Clearly, Franklin was using his "franking privilege" to facilitate faster communication for his *Gazette* several years before waiving postal fees for the other papers. The *Boston Gazette* and the nine other papers were seeing the *Pennsylvania Gazette*'s reporting but would not see each other's with the same speed until 1758. Franklin's *Gazette* entered the French & Indian war using conventions that became standard for journalism. It did not develop them over the course of the war as other presses did. The *Pennsylvania Gazette* editorialized, created the first editorial cartoon, used eyewitness reports—sometimes Franklin's own—and obtained confirmation of reports to assure authenticity. For example, in its initial reporting on the Penn's Creek Massacre, the *Gazette* declared, "We hear this Day that six People are scalp'd near George Gabriel's Mill ... about 82 miles from this town. It is told to us by a credible Person ... from the Neighbourhood, and we expect to have a Confirmation of the unhappy News soon." The following week there was confirmation, with more gory detail. Franklin's staff did not engage in as much reprinting of American news as Gill & Edes, only reprinting their war stories from the Maine frontier twice over the same period. Instead, the *Pennsylvania Gazette* absorbed reporting from multiple sources and provided distilled accounts with their own editorial perspective and analysis.[13]

So, when the *Pennsylvania Gazette* reported Massachusetts' declaration of a genocidal war against the Penobscot nations on Nov. 27, 1755, it used New York reports that reached Philadelphia quicker. David Hall may not have known that by reporting this

Boston news he was preparing Pennsylvanians to issue their own scalp bounties months later, but Franklin surely did—he began privately pushing for scalp bounties immediately afterward. By that time, the *Gazette* had moved beyond factual, eye-witness, corroborated reporting, and had begun to use its owner's "rapine" imagery, stoking reader's imaginations with fears of what would become of their women and children should the eastern counties become the frontier. There was plenty of real violence to factually report, Shingas and his warriors made sure of that. But the *Gazette*'s coverage, like Franklin's *Plain Truth* and the "JOIN, or DIE" editorial, moved beyond by overstimulating the senses through its appeals to readers' imaginations. By thus sensationalizing the violence to instill fear, and inciting racial hatred to stir militarization, Franklin's paper also foreshadowed the jingoistic yellow journalism employed by the nineteenth century press to manufacture conflicts. In 1755, the *Pennsylvania Gazette* engaged in "Red Journalism" to support Franklin the Assemblyman's push to tax proprietors and citizens alike, and to arm the Quaker Colony in self-defense. While Franklin's motives differed from Hearst and Pulitzer, his "red" tactics certainly pre-figured those of his "yellow" successors.[14]

The Allegheny Indians, the *Gazette*, and Terror on the Frontiers

The Allegheny Indians had not intended a war with Pennsylvania. In May 1755, Shingas offered support to General Braddock against the French, in return for the promise that after the war, armies would vacate lands from the Susquehanna to the Ohio with a prohibition of white settlers. Braddock dismissed Shingas: "No Savage Should Inherit the land." Months later the Allegheny Indians determined to go to war against the English to preserve their homeland. They would fight the Virginia settlers moving up Mongahela River Valley, and Pennsylvanians who were settling on the fraudulent Albany Purchase lands.[15]

As summer slipped to autumn in 1755, the Allegheny Indians began their war for independence on their southern borders, and the *Pennsylvania Gazette* reported. In September, Shingas's warriors attacked settlements in the Virginia colony, west of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Along the Green Briar River, they "killed and Captivated 15 People, burnt 11 Houses, and drove off 500 Head of Cattle." Days later the warriors moved north, attacking Maryland's Fort Cumberland, torching the Will's Creek Valley. By October, the raiders headed east down the Potomac River and burned Maryland's Conococheague Valley, where a witness lamented in the *Gazette*, "They ... burn up the Plantations, the Smoke of which darkens the Day, and hides the neighbouring Mountains from our Sight ... and lay all waste before them." The dead included "Peter Shaver, an old Indian Trader" and two other men with "their Houses, &c. burnt." On Oct. 23, Philadelphians learned from the *Gazette* that war had come to Penn's Woods at last. Allegheny Indians began to clear their eastern frontier.[16]

In Pennsylvania, the Allegheny Indians employed tactical terrorism against civilian communities. Pennsylvania's Quaker Assembly provided them no army or fortifications to engage. Moreover, the direct threats to Indian sovereignty were dishonest traders and frontier settlers accelerated by the Albany Purchase. The purchase explains why Shingas' Allegheny Indian war for independence began at Penn's Creek, where one of his lieutenants reportedly said, "We, the Delawares of Ohio, do proclaim War against the English." The Delaware nation cleaved in half three decades earlier when the Iroquois constructed a

previous Albany deal with Pennsylvania also without the Delawares' presence or consent. The Six Nations sold out the Indians of the lower Susquehanna Valley, prompting some to leave for the Allegheny in 1724. Then in 1737, the Iroquois sold out the Delawares of the Upper Delaware River Valley with the Walking Purchase. These were Iroquois diplomatic methods of redirecting white settlement away from their homeland. In 1755, Teedyuscung led the eastern Delawares. Pennsylvania and the Six Nations dispossessed his mother's clan with the Walking Purchase and he moved to a new home in the Susquehanna North Branch's Wyoming Valley. When Allegheny Indians accepted the "Hatchet from the French" as the *Gazette* reported, "to use it against the English while any of them were still alive," they chose Penn's Creek because it was the easternmost edge of the Albany Purchase and to encourage Teedyuscung's eastern Delawares to join the fight. Shingas' people were not seeking to reunite with Teedyuscung's but instead to form a tactical alliance. Together they would attack settlers and traders and push the elected Quaker Party-dominated, Franklin-led Assembly to prod the proprietors to renegotiate the Albany and Walking Purchases.[17]

Shingas, and his brothers Tewea and Pisquetomen, calculated every aspect of their war to instill maximum terror in settlers and traders. They understood Pennsylvania's political system and so pushed terrified settlers back into eastern towns where they would press their government for relief. They also knew that pacifistic Quakers controlled the Assembly and would seek to solve the crisis by renegotiating the fraudulent land deals. So, as historian Daniel Barr asserts, they used European shock and terror tactics blended with traditional Delaware war practices to awe their enemies. For more than a century, from New England to South Carolina, colonial militaries burned Indian villages, destroyed crops in the field, killed men, women, and children, and mutilated dead bodies to terrorize Indians, but not in the Quaker Colony. Many refugees of those wars became Pennsylvania Indians. Native people remembered the terror tactics employed against them but news writers, it seems, did not. Franklin and Hall's *Gazette* would transmit "savage" frontier horror stories into the consciousness of Philadelphians and their neighbors in Chester and Bucks counties, home to the lion's share of Pennsylvania's Assemblymen. Shingas relied on refugees and news stories to carry his message into the heart of Pennsylvania politics and the *Pennsylvania Gazette* obliged.[18]

Attacks began with the "Halloo," a shrill war cry from the ridges above valley farmsteads, to coordinate the raiders' movements. War parties ranged from twenty to forty men, split into three or four teams. Gunshots followed the Halloo as warriors descended first on men working their fields, killing whomever they could and chasing the rest to their cabins. There they killed the men and older boys and left the disfigured bodies on display. When an armed group of 45 Paxton Township men rode to Penn's Creek to bury the dead, the *Gazette* reported, "they found no less than 14 Bodies most shockingly mangled" including Jean Jacque Le Roy's charred remains. When friendly Shamokin Indians Andrew Montour and Delaware George warned them against travelling home on the west side of the Susquehanna, the Paxtonians distrustfully ignored them and rode straight into an Allegheny warrior ambush. Barely half the party made it home. Later at Tulpehocken a burial detail found "one Odwaller murder'd and scalped," and "Caspar Spring's Brains were beat out ... that Beslinger's Brains were beat out, his Mouth much mangled, one of his Eyes cut out, and one of his Ears gashed." The warriors captured most of the children and women, those strong enough to march to Kittanning. On Nov. 20, the

Gazette reported Phillip Weiser's description of the Tulpehocken raid that included one woman and two dead and scalped children—too old and too young to travel. Weiser also found one scalped yet still living six-year-old girl. Some captives filled the traditional purpose of adoption. Others served as diplomatic pawns to force a deal on the Albany Purchase. Others they sold to the French, who likewise used them as diplomatic bargaining chips. At Tulpehocken, the raiders looted "all their Household Goods," foodstuffs, "Horses and Cattle." What they could not carry they destroyed. War parties killed livestock, burned houses, barns, and crops in the field. Up the Conococheague Creek, in Pennsylvania's Great Cove, there was "nothing to be seen but Houses burning, most of their Cattle shot down."[19]

The terror tactics worked. Days after Penn's Creek the *Gazette* reported from Harris's Ferry on Oct. 30, "The Women and Children in the Back Parts of Cumberland, Lancaster and Berks Counties are all come or coming down ... to this City" and that "the Distress and Confusion our People in general are in on the Frontiers, is inexpressible." The next week there were reports from Great Cove that the people were building a fort at Shippensburg to "put all the women and children." The "Town is full of People, the Back Inhabitants being all moving in with their Families, five or six of which are in a House." Yet, in the same edition, the *Gazette* reported that an express from Carlisle brought news that the Delawares and Shawnees had attacked the Great Cove and Tonoloway Creek settlements. The people of Carlisle "expect dailey to be attacked here, and at Harris' Ferry." Refugees carried fear with them, which swept eastward like contagion through frontier towns into the Pennsylvania core. On Nov. 13, Franklin's *Gazette* reported:

> People in the Great Cove are in the greatest Distress imaginable ... flying with their Children to save their Lives, many of them having nothing to subsist on, no Bed to lie upon, nor hardly any Clothes to defend them from the Cold, being obliged to leave every Thing behind them, or run the Risque of being murder'd by the merciless Savages.[20]

Shingas's terror campaign on the frontiers, rapidly reported in the *Gazette*, led to Pennsylvania military funding, authorization to build forts, and the raising of a Pennsylvania army on Nov. 24–25, 1755. By spring, Governor Morris issued a Declaration of War against the Delawares with the offer of scalp bounties to ranging parties of civilians. These were, of course, unintended consequences of Shingas's war plan. Still, Nov. 24–25, 1755 also brought Indian victory. The Allegheny Indians attacked the Moravian mission at Gnaddenhutten that day in Teedyuscung's neighborhood—killing pacifist missionaries and Indian converts alike. The eastern Delawares responded by joining their western kin and other Allegheny Indians attacking Northampton County settlements over the next two years. The war widened, and the terror tactics continued, but terrorism carried still more unintended consequences as blowback. Armed Pennsylvania counter-attacked. In September 1756, Colonel John Armstrong destroyed the Allegheny town of Kittanning—Shingas's, Tewea's, and Pisquetomen's home, in a failed attempt to redeem more than one hundred white captives.[21]

Nevertheless, Shingas' warriors continued pounding settlements on their eastern frontier. They killed perhaps a thousand settlers and captured twice that number. Meanwhile his brother Tamaqua and their eastern cousin Teedyuscung began strategizing to bring Pennsylvania to a peace conference. When British General John Forbes began his

campaign to attack Fort Duquesne, he demanded Pennsylvania treat with the Indians and separate them from the French. At Easton, in October 1758, Pennsylvania officials met with eastern and western Delawares, renegotiated the Albany Purchase eastward to the Allegheny Mountain, and promised prohibition of white settlement west of that line and fair trade at western posts in exchange for Indian loyalty and the return of colonial captives. Teedyuscung pushed on the Walking Purchase issue in the east, but Pennsylvania delayed that discussion and split the Delawares' interest. Without Allegheny Indian allies, the French abandoned Fort Dusquesne ahead of Forbes' invasion and the British won control of the Forks. The Allegheny Indians had won their war using terrorism the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, but not their independence.[22]

At Easton, they failed to force Pennsylvania and the British to abandon their Allegheny country military fortifications after vanquishing the French. They wanted fair traders at those posts, not soldiers. Not only did the British continue arming Forts Bedford and Ligonier, but also they began construction of the massive Fort Pitt as soon as the French abandoned the Forks. More ominous was the road Forbes cut from Carlisle to Pittsburgh, and the road Braddock cut from Virginia up the Monongahela River to the Forks. Foreboding too was Pennsylvania's fort building spree, twenty-nine forts, and strong-houses that stretched southwest along the Blue Mountain from the Lehigh to the Juniata River. Once peace came in 1758, old settlers moved back to their farmsteads. Pennsylvania and Virginia newcomers seeking their own economic independence streamed west to squat illegally using the new roads. Meanwhile, Pennsylvania traders returned to the Allegheny country. While licensed traders generally obeyed the liquor-peddling laws, they charged higher prices than the French did. Unlicensed traders plied their customers with gallons of rum before charging exorbitant prices. Worse, a new British commanding general in North America, Jeffrey Amherst, set new policies in 1760 that forbade weapons and ammunition sales to Indians, depriving them of needed tools to procure venison to eat and hides to trade. Then he cancelled the traditional gift giving of food, blankets, and tools to Indians that began diplomatic parleys. At a Fort Pitt conference that year, Delaware George addressed the British commandant, "Brother, take pitty on Our Women, Children & Warriors, we are a poor people, and cannot Live without your Assistance; let a Fair & Open Trade be continued to be Carry'd on by your People amongst Us." When pressed to return captives, Tamaqua promised to do his best, but said many adoptees did not wish to return. He could not force Shawnees or Senecas to return captives who were now family members. Theirs was a confederation of equal nations.[23]

Still the settlers came. Pennsylvania's population doubled from 1740 to 1760 to 200,000. Pennsylvania settlers from the south and Connecticut immigrants from the east poured into the northern Susquehanna's Wyoming Valley where Teedyuscung's eastern Delawares lived. Fourteen Virginia families migrated to the Redstone Creek, up the Monongahela from Pittsburgh, and there were now upwards of 100 Pennsylvania families living around Fort Bedford, with a similar number around Fort Ligonier—all in Shingas's and Tamaqua's neighborhood. To soothe Indian anger, General Henry Bouquet sent out a party from Fort Ligonier to burn squatters' cabins who were not directly serving the British fortifications. Still the colonists came. Anxious settlers, armed soldiers, conniving traders, and aggrieved Indians engaged in regular incidents of interpersonal violence. Thefts, fights, and murders increased around the forts where all parties coalesced.

Meanwhile, word reached Indian country that the French would capitulate to the English and surrender Indian land at the coming talks in Paris. In the winter and spring of 1762–63, Ottawa Chief Pontiac circulated war belts (diplomatic documents recorded on strings of wampum sewn into belts) from Michigan eastward to launch a pan-Indian war against the British to dislodge them from western forts. The Allegheny Indians accepted the belts, and launched their Second War for Independence stating, "They were never conquered by any Nation" and "the French had no right to give away their Country."[24]

On May 27, 1763, Tamaqua was in the Tuscarora Valley, north of Carlisle, warning a trusted Pennsylvania trader to leave the region. Trouble loomed. He told Thomas Calhoon to deliver a message east. The *Pennsylvania Gazette* ran it weeks later: "Brothers the English, We thought that your King had made a Peace with us, and all the Western Indians: For our Part we ... will not be cheated any more." The same day Delaware war chief "the Wolf" led an attack on Virginia Colonel William Clapham's settlement twenty-five miles up the Monongahela from Fort Pitt, killing his entire family. The Allegheny Indians would use similar tactics as in 1755 toward similar ends in 1763 but with a key difference. Like 1755, they used terrorism to cleanse the land of white settlers to send them back east with tales of cruelty intended to bring Pennsylvania and Virginia governments to a peace conference. But unlike 1755, they would take far fewer prisoners and took away fewer scalps. In 1755, the French paid for scalps and for prisoners. By 1763, the Seven Years War ended. New France became British Canada. Moreover, the Allegheny Indians suffered the annihilation of Kittanning in 1756. When Tewea and his family ran from their burning home, Colonel Armstrong's men killed them all. The English took no prisoners. The Allegheny Indians remembered. Therefore, when the Wolf tomahawked and scalped Colonel Clapham, he administered the same fate to two women and a child. The *Gazette* sensationalized the event by leaving tantalizing gaps for the readers' imaginations to fill. The "Women were treated in such a Manner," the *Gazette* reported, "that it would be indecent to mention it." In June, warriors killed four whole families along Dunning's Creek near Fort Bedford, taking no prisoners, burning everything. Attacks spread east quickly toward Shippensburg. By July, warriors sacked the Tuscarora Valley along Sherman's Creek near the Susquehanna, just north of the Blue Mountain from Carlisle. Killing fifty-four, they burned everything. The *Gazette* reported, "the Indians had set Fire to Houses, Barns, Corn, Hay, and in short, to every Thing that was combustible; so that the whole Country seemed to be in one general Blaze." Warriors also attacked traders on the Beaver River. The attacks worked. Colonists fled their settlements. By August, refugees streamed into Shippensburg, Carlisle, Lancaster, and Philadelphia. In Shippensburg alone, the *Gazette* reported, "there are 1384 refugees, 301 men, 345 women, and 738 children housed in barns, stables, cellars, and sheds, the dwelling houses all being crowded."[25]

This time there were military targets, the British and Pennsylvania forts. The day after the Clapham attack, Indian warriors tomahawked and scalped two British soldiers at Fort Pitt's sawmill and then burned it. While harassing Fort Pitt, they attacked the smaller Pennsylvania forts to destroy them and to convince the British that operating their larger forts—Bedford, Ligonier, and Pitt—was not worth the cost. Those they hoped to demilitarize, persuade the Pennsylvania government to use as trading posts, and to entertain none but honest traders. Here the western Delawares, with their Shawnee and Seneca allies, worked together as confederated Allegheny Indian armies. Between June 16 and 21, the *Gazette* reported that the Senecas overran Forts Venango, LeBoef, and Presque Isle up

the Allegheny, former French posts in British hands. They cut off communication from Forts Niagara to Pitt. Meanwhile, the Delawares and Shawnees attacked settlers who lived around and supplied Forts Bedford, Ligonier, and Pitt. As in 1755, the strategy seemed to be working as Fort Pitt's commander agreed to a parley with Indian leaders on June 24. But the Indian tactics of the first war changed the circumstances of the second effecting a different outcome. The British and Pennsylvania had militarized their frontier and stood ready to cleanse the land of all Indians.[26]

When Delaware warriors Chief Turtle's Heart and Mamaltee entered Fort Pitt under truce, they warned Captain Simeon Ecuyer that more Indians from the west were coming. He should abandon the fort. Ecuyer declined, stating that his reinforcements were marching "to Chastise" them. He could defend the fort "against all the Indians in the Woods." As Captain William Trent wrote in his journal that day, when the Delaware Indians left, "Out of regard to them we gave them two Blankets and a Handkerchief out of the Small Pox Hospital. I hope it will have the desired effect." This use of biological warfare, approved by General Jeffrey Amherst, carried the effect Trent desired. Days later, Pennsylvania raised 700 troops. They sent some to join General Bouquet's effort to reinforce Fort Pitt as disease brewed in Allegheny country. On their way, Delaware and Shawnee warriors intercepted them near a creek named Bushy Run. They battled the entire day, essentially to a draw. Bouquet, however, managed to reinforce Fort Pitt and thwart the Indian military strategy to negotiate a British military withdrawal. Weeks later, Pennsylvania soldiers from Paxton ranged up the Susquehanna's West Branch and engaged unsuccessfully with the Allegheny Indians, reprising their humiliation after Penn's Creek in 1755. In October, they headed up the North Branch to Wyoming to attack the eastern Delawares. They found Connecticut settlers "most cruelly butchered," the *Gazette* reported, a "Woman roasted, and had two Hinges in Her Hands—supposed to be put in red hot; and several of the Men had Awls thrust in their Eyes, and Spears, Arrows, Pitchforks, &c. sticking in their Bodies." This was revenge for the Connecticut settler's murder of Teedyuscung the previous April near Wyoming, just before the second war began. The Paxton men would remember what they saw. They selected an easier target for their revenge two months later. The Allegheny Indians and eastern Delawares continued to win these battles, but they could not win the war. Without the French to re-arm them, small pox cutting through them, and facing a militarized British and Pennsylvania frontier, the Allegheny Indians gradually came to a peace in 1764. They abandoned their homes of forty years on the Allegheny, Ohio, and Beaver Rivers, and moved out of Pennsylvania, deeper into the Ohio Country, where eastern Delawares would join them.[27]

Assemblyman Franklin, Colonel Franklin, the *Gazette*, and Terrifying Philadelphians

Beginning with "JOIN, or DIE," the *Pennsylvania Gazette* began molding a public opinion in the east that unintentionally undercut the government's ability to maintain peace in the west. Settlers did not need newspapers to awaken them to the horrors of war. Shingas' war parties achieved that. Philadelphians relied on the press to terrify them. Franklin's aim as an Assemblyman in 1754 was to mold an inter-colonial public opinion for a united military presence against the French and Indian allies. He needed to move the non-pacifists in his Quaker Party to militarize Pennsylvania.

The three original counties surrounding the City of Brotherly Love, Philadelphia, Bucks, and Chester were the key to victory. The *Gazette* wrote sensational accounts, often teasing readers with allusions to events too "indecent to mention." "The Savages carry off all the young Women," the *Gazette* wailed, as settlers "were leaving their Habitations, for fear of falling into the Hands of these Blood-thirsty Savages." Franklin's paper reported that the "merciless Savages" left "Bodies most shockingly mangled," while "the Distress and Confusion ... on the Frontiers, is inexpressible." The same paper that sometimes waited for confirmation of its stories also reported rumors of war that proved to be unfounded, but terrified readers nonetheless. On Nov. 6, the *Gazette* printed shoddy "intelligence" supposedly from friendly Shamokin Senecas Andrew Montour and Scarouday that "a considerable body of Indians, with about 100 French, amounting in all to about 1500, set out from Fort Duquesne, to be divided when they approached the Frontiers into certain Divisions, viz. Forty against Shamokin. Forty to come down Juniata, and Forty to Harris's Ferry, and so on quite over the Province."[28]

While there was no enemy force of 1,500 headed east, the same day the *Gazette* reported the Indians' coordinated attacks on Great Cove and Tulpehocken. These reports lent credence to the rumored army and exaggerated eastern fears. Moreover, the reports appeared in the edition three days after Governor Morris requested and the Assembly denied defense funding without proprietary estate taxes. The pacifist and anti-proprietary wings of the Quaker Party banded together against Franklin's plan. As the colony's official printing office, Franklin's *Gazette* printed the entirety of the discourse between the Assembly and Governor Morris over the ensuing three weeks.

In autumn 1755, with his paper reporting the raids of "Shingas the Terrible," Franklin co-authored a bill to tax proprietary lands in exchange for £60,000 for defense. Then, Franklin was the single-author of a militia bill to militarize the colony. Blocking him in the first instance was Morris who represented the proprietors' interests and exercised the executive negative over the Quaker-led Assembly. Second, the pacifist faction within his own Quaker Party prevented militarization. Morris lost a bruising battle with the Assembly to fund Braddock's campaign earlier that summer, disappointing Crown and Parliament—only to see Franklin become the hero with his wagons. Now Morris would use the frontier cries filling Franklin's *Gazette* to push the Assembly to militarize. Morris and the Assembly, with Franklin as the mediator playing both sides against the middle, engaged in a sparring match from Nov. 3–24, dominating the front pages of the *Gazette*. Franklin authored or co-authored all the Assembly's printed vituperative replies to the Governor, while he was still engaged in the business of settling the accounts from his wagon adventure. Meanwhile, the *Gazette* reported Shingas' war parties attacks in the Juniata, Susquehanna, and then the Lehigh Valley. It looked like the Allegheny Indian strategy of disrupting Pennsylvania politics was working.[29]

On Nov. 3, Morris blamed the frontier distress on Quaker intransigence. He seized on Franklin's rumor of a French and Indian army of 1,500, but moved it east to Shamokin, less than three days from Philadelphia. Morris demanded defense appropriation and a militia with compulsory service requirements beginning at age eighteen. He was wrong about the enemy position and the Assembly called him on it. The documents he submitted included a report from Fort Duquesne, not Shamokin. Moreover, the pacifist Quakers countered that Indian attacks fell within the Albany Purchase. That grievance, not Braddock's defeat, caused the uprising. The Quaker Party demanded an investigation

into the Albany Purchase to solve the crisis diplomatically. The Assembly, through Franklin, chided Morris, "Those who would give up essential Liberty to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety"—this even as Franklin was drafting his own militia bill. The Allegheny Indians hoped to bring this pressure and division to Philadelphia.[30]

Morris's Shamokin alarm prompted Paxton Township men to mobilize. "The Country is now assembling at Harris's Ferry," the *Gazette* reported, "to oppose the Enemy should they advance so far." In the *Gazette*, Morris despaired of "the cruel Ravages of these bloody Invaders" and implored the Assembly "to afford the necessary and timely Assistance to the Back Inhabitants." The attacks sent settlers flying, "crowding into the more settled Parts of the Province, which in their Turn will become the Frontier if some Stop is not speedily" effected. When the Assembly replied they wished to remedy Indian grievances rather than escalate a war, Morris publicly chastised them. In "this Time of imminent Danger ... you talk of regaining the Affections of the Indians, now employed in laying waste the Country, and butchering the Inhabitants." In the same issue, Franklin's paper listed the names, descriptions, and relations of twenty-seven men, women, and children killed and captured in the attack at Great Cove by the "merciless Savages." All of this produced the desired effect. The *Gazette*'s reporting disarmed the pacifist wing of the Quaker Party and provided Franklin and his anti-proprietary wing the votes to create a defense bill that taxed proprietary estates. He managed to pass it with pacifist abstentions, but Morris refused to sign. Instead, the Governor countered with a one-time proprietary gift of £5,000 in lieu of estate taxes. That did it. The bill passed on the twenty-fourth, and Franklin became one of the Commissioners responsible for defense spending and acquisition. Franklin's militia bill passed the next day, and the governor accepted the Quaker Party's demand to raise the age for voluntary—not compulsory—service to age twenty-one for the force of 1,400. Philadelphians would learn of the first Gnadenhutten attack by combined western and eastern Delawares two days later. Morris sent Franklin to the Lehigh Valley to coordinate defense, and on Dec. 29, a Delaware war party defeated Pennsylvania militia at Gnadenhutten. Morris then commissioned Franklin as military commander on Jan. 1. Franklin went to war, leading an army and carrying a pen, charged with building a fort at Gnadenhutten.[31]

The same day Pennsylvanians learned of their new army from Franklin's *Gazette* they also learned that Massachusetts would launch a genocidal war. Governor Shirley declared the "Penobscot Tribe of Indians to be enemies" and enjoined all the King's subjects to "embrace all Opportunities of ... killing, and destroying all and every of the aforesaid Indians." They added scalp bounties for encouragement. Massachusetts did not discriminate between combatants or non-combatants, men or women, elderly or children. Franklin approved. That same day he complained to Richard Partridge that because of Governor Morris's delay in accepting the Assembly's defense bills "our Publick Affairs went into the utmost Confusion, Hundreds of Families were driven from their Habitations, and the People ripe for an Insurrection." He continued, "If we cannot have a Governor of some Discretion (for this Gentleman is half a Madman) fully impower'd to do what may be necessary for the Good of the Province ... this Government will be the worst on the Continent."

On Jan. 3, Governor Morris used his executive authority to order his militia officers to "inform the men" enlisted in the militia "that they shall receive a reward from the

Government of forty Pieces of Eight for every Indian they shall kill and scalp in any action they have with them." The following day some under Franklin's command came under fire at Allemängel. This was the first of Franklin's four weekly war correspondent reports to the *Pennsylvania Gazette* from Jan. 6–27. Following the skirmish, the troops took five scalps but hurried off back to Gnadenhutten leaving three scalps still attached. Franklin reported, "The People are so elated with this Success, that 150 Men are gone over ... to scalp the others if not removed." It was like a gold rush. The following week he gave a complete description from eyewitness accounts of the Dec. 29 action at Gnadenhutten and the January Allemängel incident. Six days after filing these reports, Franklin upped the ante in a letter to Morris, "I want much to hear ... the Determination of your Honour and the Commissioners may have come to, for the Encouragement of Volunteer Scalping Parties."[32]

Completing Fort Allen, Franklin returned to Philadelphia in February, finding the *Gazette* reporting had made him a local hero. The Philadelphia City Regiment elected Franklin as their Colonel. When he left the city in March for postal business, Morris hatched a plan for a general Declaration of War to justify a scalp bounty for civilians to collect. He determined on a Proclamation to sidestep the Assembly. Someone leaked the plan. Quaker Assemblymen drafted an opposition letter to Morris—without Franklin—that the governor ignored. Franklin's complete silence on the matter in his correspondence shows that he approved. In fact, in the weeks before the Proclamation the *Gazette* ran the captivity stories of John Baker and John Craig, the timing of which one historian determined "was no accident" as Franklin's *Gazette* was the ideal editorial vessel to stir up support among the populace of Philadelphia." On April 14, 1756, Morris made the Proclamation, with promises to pay civilians for the scalps of "every Male Indian above Ten Years old: 130 Dollars. For the Scalp of every Indian woman [no age limit mentioned]: 50 Dollars." The order was careful to avoid the use of the word "children." Only six months after abandoning seventy-three years of peace, the Pennsylvania Assembly followed Massachusetts' lead and turned the war into an authorized frontier genocide, as the order effectively required no proof that the scalp taken was one of an enemy. On June 4, the pacifist Quaker Assemblymen resigned their seats, filled by militant Churchmen.[33]

With government authorization, frontier settlers formed their own voluntary "scalping militias." They ranged about chasing Indian raiders to negligible effect but taking scalps from any Indians when they could. Then after the 1758, Treaty of Easton, Pennsylvania authorities tried to put their genie back in the bottle. Suddenly and incomprehensibly to frontier people who suffered so many raids, killing Indians became murder again in 1758. As the borderlands between the Indians, Pennsylvanians, Virginians, and Connecticut claimants refilled with settlers, inter-racial violence raged around Carlisle, the Monongahela River, and the Wyoming Valley. All this was thanks to Shingas and Franklin who stoked a provincial public opinion favoring ethnic cleansing. Neither intended this consequence by their tactics, but it came nonetheless. By 1763, Indian war returned to the Pennsylvania frontier, and the *Pennsylvania Gazette* would cover it much the same way it did in 1755.[34]

In 1755, Franklin's paper used military correspondence from other colonies' forts to relay reliable intelligence about Indian strategy. He obtained expresses from Fort Loudon, Virginia, and Fort Cumberland, Maryland. In 1756, Franklin became a military correspondent for the *Gazette*. In 1763, Captain William Trent sent expresses from Fort Pitt to Philadelphia. The *Gazette* was the first paper to break

the story of Pontiac's Rebellion at Detroit with Trent's dispatches on June 9, but Franklin knew this at least three days earlier as Hall shared the news pre-publication. On June 6, Franklin wrote to provincial agent Richard Jackson in London, the "Indians on the Ohio have broke out again, scalp'd a Number of People, and seiz'd some Horse Loads of Goods. I do not hear of any Offence given them, and suppose it occasion'd by the mere Relish they acquir'd in the last War for Plunder." On June 16, 30, and July 7, the *Gazette* reported Indian attacks at Fort Pitt with information Trent recorded in his journal only two weeks before. Even with Forbes Road, this was remarkable since travel to Philadelphia was at least ten days. From Trent, easterners learned quickly of the Clapham settlement's fate including the "two Women ... treated in such a Manner, that it would be indecent to mention." Indians killed trader Patrick Dunn at Beaver Creek, all of Captain Callender's people perished, and "Mr. Crawford is made Prisoner, and his People all murdered." They read of four whole families slain at Dunning's Creek near Bedford, where "Two Men are brought in, alive, tomahawked and scalped more than half the Head over ... a Scene of bloody and savage Cruelty." At the scene, "three Men, two of which are in the Bloom of Life, the other an old Man, lying scalped (two of them still alive) thereon." The Assembly raised 700 troops on Trent's expresses. By June 27, Franklin wrote again to Jackson "News is brought from all Quarters of the Indians" commencing "Hostilities, without having first made any Complaint." Then he speculated from news that the reason might be a French influence, or Amherst's withholding of presents and sale of rum, the prohibitions on selling them powder, or attempts to bring "them to live by Agriculture." Franklin must have mused similarly to friend Peter Collinson, who corrected Franklin from London that "We are concerned at the new rupture of the Indians, French Emissaries may have had Some Share in it but I am afraid it is more owing to our Neglect and Misconduct." Franklin was willfully ignoring the settlers' moves into the Ohio Country, in direct violation of the 1758 Treaty of Easton.[35]

On July 10, the *Gazette* reported the attacks on Sherman's Valley, north of Carlisle. Week after week, it tallied a growing death toll. Reports of the attacks became more lurid. The *Boston Gazette* now adapted news from the *Pennsylvania Gazette* and other Philadelphia news, as it had learned from Franklin's paper since 1755. Gill & Edes mimicked Hall's combination of specifics with vagaries.

> By the Philadelphia Papers we have the following Accounts ... in Sherman's Valley, they had murdered 3 Men and a Lad and were then shooting the Cattle ... near Shippensburgh ... [the Indians] murdered a Man and two Women, one of whom they scalped and mangled in a cruel manner.

Repeating the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, the Boston paper reported, "54 Persons have been killed in about 15 Days." More than in 1755, there were reports of the conditions of the refugees in Shippensburg, Carlisle, and Lancaster, and all the way to Philadelphia. From Carlisle, both *Gazettes* reported.

> That it was most dismal to see the Streets filled with People, in whose Countenances might be discovered a Mixture of Grief, Madness and Despair; and to hear, now and then, the Sighs and Groans of Men; the disconsolate Lamentations of Women, and the Screams of Children, who had lost their nearest and dearest Relatives: And that on both Sides of the Sasquehannah,

> for some Miles, the Woods were filled with poor Families, and their Cattle, who make Fires, and live like the Savages.[36]

By Aug. 4, Franklin's *Gazette* reported Sherman's Valley farmers were headed back over the Tuscarora Mountain from Carlisle. Under guard by some of the 700 troops Pennsylvania raised a month earlier, they attempted to harvest their wheat. Most were "Cumberland Boys," a Carlisle company. The "Paxton Boys" company was not among them. They stayed home on a rumor that 900 Indians were on their way down the West Branch to attack Fort Augusta at Shamokin and would then head to Harris's Ferry to attack their homes and farms. They marched upriver to pre-empt the invasion where they ran into a party of western Delawares at Great Island. Numbering less than five percent of the rumored 900, the Allegheny Indians administered a humiliating defeat, killing four and wounding six Paxton men. In October, the Paxton company ranged up the North Branch to intercept eastern Delaware raiders and to destroy their town at Wyalusing. They failed again. This time they were too late. They found the mutilated corpses of Connecticut settlers in the Wyoming Valley including the roasted woman with the hinges in her hands, and Wyalusing town deserted. The Paxton Boys desperately wanted to kill Indians. Indian attacks, the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, and the Pennsylvania government fueled this desire, but they were too inept at every turn.[37]

The Paxton Boys, Franklin's Genie, the Revolution, and Ethnic Cleansing

On the morning of Dec. 14, 1763, at last the Paxton Boys would have their day. They rode into the Lancaster County Indian town of Conestoga. William Penn made a treaty with hundreds of Conestoga, Shawnee, and Conoy Indians there sixty-two years earlier granting them a protected "manor." By this time, Conestoga Manor was home to just twenty surviving "Conestoga Indians." The Paxton Boys suspected one Will Sock was passing information to Delaware raiders who devastated Lancaster, Berks, and Northampton Counties. Sock was not at home. He and thirteen others were selling brooms and baskets to their Lancaster County neighbors. The Rangers entered the lone occupied house, murdered six unarmed Conestogas, and then rode back to Paxton. This news was too late for the *Gazette*'s Dec. 15 edition. Franklin's paper had no good excuse for ignoring it a week later. The *Gazette* is not extant for Dec. 29, 1763 or Jan. 5 and 12, 1764, so we do not know how Franklin's paper responded to the genie he unleashed, but the absence of coverage on Dec. 22 is telling. The *Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser* published proprietor John Penn's Proclamation calling for the arrest of the murders on Dec. 29. "A Number of People, armed and mounted on Horseback, unlawfully assembled together," the proprietor said, "and went to the Indian Town, in the Conestoga Mannor, in Lancaster County, and without the least Reason or Provocation, in cool blood, barbarously killed Six of the Indians settled there, and burnt and destroyed all their Houses and Effects." He then called on all friendly Indians living in Pennsylvania to come to Philadelphia where the government would shelter and protect them on Province Island in the Delaware River.[38]

Meanwhile, Lancaster officials put the remaining Conestogas under lock and key at the Lancaster workhouse to protect them from the Paxton vigilantes, but it was not enough. The Paxton Boys, numbering perhaps sixty, rode into Lancaster town two days after Christmas. In broad daylight, they brushed aside the Sheriff and broke into the workhouse. They

removed the last fourteen Conestogas on this earth and hacked them to death with tomahawks. They were three married couples and their eight children, all unarmed. None assisted the renewed Indian raids that year. In January, the Paxton Boys turned their bloodlust on Philadelphia where the Pennsylvania government protected the pacifist Moravian Indians. The Paxton Boys claimed—again without evidence—that they provided intelligence to their warrior kinsmen. Numbering in the hundreds, armed with muskets, rifles, and tomahawks, the Paxton Boys marched on Philadelphia to kill all the Moravian Indians. Philadelphians worried they would raze the city. Benjamin Franklin raised his militia and marched it to Germantown to intercept the mob, to put his genie back in to the bottle he uncorked. His paper reported the confrontation in its Feb. 9 issue this way:

> The insurgents, it seems, intended to rendezvous at Germantown ... and those who assembled there, being made acquainted with the Force raised to oppose them, listened to the reasonable Discourses and Advice of some prudent Persons, who voluntarily went out to meet and admonish them ... and promised to return peaceably to their Habitations, leaving only two of their Number to present a Petition to the Governor and Assembly.

Instead of attributing responsibility for creating the vigilantism, Franklin's paper gave him credit for keeping the peace. The Paxton Boys wanted equal representation in the Assembly with the eastern counties and for Pennsylvania to open a full, wider war with the Indians complete with a new civilian scalp bounty. They trusted Franklin, the democrat and militarist, to do the job. There would be a new scalp bounty, but no democratic reform. Instead, Franklin excoriated the Paxton Boys in a blistering pamphlet published by Hall, *A Narrative of the Late Massacres, in Lancaster County*. He identified all the victims by name, with an account of each of their lives, and castigated the Paxton Boys as "cruel" and "barbarous Men who committed the atrocious act ... to the eternal Disgrace of their Country and Colour ... THE BLOOD OF THE INNOCENT WILL CRY TO HEAVEN FOR VENGEANCE." Franklin thundered against the vigilantism he created by sensationalizing Indian violence and pushing for a civilian scalp bounty. He wore the blood of the innocent on his hands too. Franklin suffered defeat at the polls in 1764 when his monster turned on him.[39]

By fashioning a public opinion that ethnically cleansed Pennsylvania of Indians, the Allegheny Indians and the *Gazette* undermined the Pennsylvania government. When the Indians ran short of supplies in 1764, they sued for peace. Most left Pennsylvania for good. Into the vacuum Connecticut and Virginia settlers returned. They waged war with Pennsylvania Provincial Officials in the Wyoming and Monongahela-Ohio Valleys until there was no longer a province of Pennsylvania, but a failed state. In Cumberland County, the Cumberland Boys re-styled and disguised themselves as the "Black Boys." They challenged the authority of the British army at forts that protected Pennsylvania mercantile firms that traded arms and ammunition with Ohio Indians in exchange for deerskins and furs. Westerners would come to Philadelphia in May 1776 to help the city's leather aprons physically overturn the eastern and mercantile-dominated Pennsylvania Assembly. They declared independence, designed a democratic constitution with equal county representation for a new "state," and helped launch an American Revolution. Franklin hitched his wagon to this new war and regained his popularity. That Revolution accelerated trans-Appalachian ethnic cleansing as the Continental Congress had to offer land bounties in the west to win recruits to its army and issued scalp bounties to encourage Indian dispossession. Such were the unintended consequences of terrorizing Pennsylvanians with Red Journalism.[40]

Notes

1 Ruth Ann Denaci, "The Penn's Creek Massacre and the Captivity of Marie Le Roy and Barbara Leininger," *Pennsylvania History* 74 (Summer 2007): 307–8, 311; *Pennsylvania Archives* (Joseph Severns & Co., 1853): Series 1, Volume 3: 633–34; Brady J. Crytzer, *War in the Peaceable Kingdom: The Kittanning Raid of 1756* (Yardley: Westholme Publishing, 2016), 61–64; James Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 227–28. On the sources of the Allegheny Indians' 1755–58 war, see Michael M. McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and its Peoples* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 5–141; Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, & Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), 71–108; Daniel K Richter, *Trade, Land, and Power: The Struggle for Eastern North America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 155–76; James H. Merrell, "Shamokin, 'the very seat of the Prince of darkness': Unsettling the Early American Frontier," in *Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750–1830*, eds. Andrew R. L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 16–59; Daniel P. Barr, "The Land is Ours and Not Yours: The Western Delawares and the Seven Years War in the Upper Ohio Valley," in *The Boundaries Between Us: Natives and Newcomers along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750–1850*, ed. idem, (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2006), 25–43; idem, "'A Road for Warriors': The Western Delawares and the Seven Years War," *Pennsylvania History* 73 (Winter 2006), 1–36; Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 25–26; Matthew C. Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754–1765* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 9–45; William A Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753–1758* (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1960), 3–38; Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 240–48; Colin G. Calloway, *The Shawnees and the War for America* (New York: Viking, 2007), 1–28; Timothy B. Shannon, *Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier* (New York: Viking, 2008), 134–51; and David L. Preston, *The Texture of Contact: European and Indian Settler Communities on the Frontiers of Iroquoia, 1667–1783* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 147–77.

2 Benjamin Franklin to Richard Partridge, Oct. 7, 1755, in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, vol. 6 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 217–19 (hereafter *PBF*). For Franklin's printing, postal, and political career, see Labaree and H.W. Brands', *The First American: The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin* (New York: Doubleday, 2000).

3 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 9, 1754, Oct. 23, 1755; David Copeland, "JOIN, or DIE: America's Press during the French and Indian War," *Journalism History* 24 (Autumn 1998): 112–27. Fred Anderson, *A Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in North America, 1754–1766* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), 78, 94–96, 109–10; Merrell, *Into the American Woods*, 232; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 27, 1763; on the distribution of the "JOIN, or DIE" editorial and cartoon see *PBF* 5: 272–75.

4 For the enduring effectiveness of Pennsylvania's ethnic cleansing in the second half of the eighteenth century, see Daniel Richter, *Native Americans' Pennsylvania* (University Park: Pennsylvania Historical Association, 2005), 7–9, 55–92.

5 On Penn's policies see Francis Jennings, "Miquon's Passing: Indian-European Relations in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1674–1755," (Ph.D. Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1965), 54–93; for documents to support see Jean R. Soderlund, *William Penn and the Founding of Pennsylvania: 1680–1684 A Documentary History* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983). On Penn's heirs, Proprietary secretary James Logan, and the Walking Purchase, see Francis Jennings, "The Scandalous Indian Policy of William Penn's Sons: Deeds and Documents of the Walking Purchase," *Pennsylvania History* 37 (January 1970): 19–39; and Steven Craig Harper, *Promised Land: Penn's Holy Experiment, The Walking Purchase, and the Dispossession of the Delawares, 1600–1763* (Bethlehem: Lehigh University

Press, 2006); on Franklin and David Hall, see Brands, *The First American*, 164–66, 188–89; Franklin, *Plain Truth: or, Serious Considerations on the Present State of the City of Philadelphia, and Province of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: David Hall, printer, 1747).

6 Brands, *The First American*, 181–86.
7 William S. Hanna, *Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 48–75.
8 Franklin, "JOIN, or DIE," *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 9, 1754.
9 Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 101–6.
10 Crytzer, *War in the Peaceable Kingdom*, 55–56; Brands, *The First American*, 247–51.
11 Brands, *The First American*, 233–34; Hanna, *Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics*, 69–70.
12 Copeland, "'JOIN, or DIE,'" 112–27; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 9, 1754; Franklin to Partridge, May 8, 1754, *PBF* 5: 272–75; *New York Mercury*, May 13, 1754; *Boston Gazette*, May 21, 1754; *Boston News-Letter*, May 21, 1754.
13 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Oct. 23, 30, 1755. For comparison, see *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Oct. 16-Nov. 27, 1755 versus *Boston Gazette*, Oct. 27–Dec. 8, 1755; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 9–Aug. 18, 1763 versus *Boston Gazette*, June 20–Aug. 29, 1763.
14 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Nov. 27, 1755.
15 Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 154–57.
16 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Oct.9, 16, 23, and Nov. 13, 1755.
17 On the Allegheny Indians' military tactics and strategies in 1755, see Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 45–52; Preston, *Texture of Contact*, 147–58; Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, 95–124. On the destructiveness of European settler's domesticated beasts to Indian spaces, see Virginia Dejohn Anderson, *Creatures of the Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Stephen Aron, "Pigs and Hunters: 'Rights in the Woods' on the Trans-Appalachian Frontier," in *Contact Points*, eds. Cayton and Teute, 175–204. McConnell, *A Country Between*, 21–46, 119–22; Denaci, "The Penn's Creek Massacre," 307–32; Patrick Spero, *Frontier Country: The Politics of War in Early Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 118–20; Barr, "A Road for Warriors," 25–26; Merrell, *Into the American Woods, 232;* Jennings, *Empire of* Fortune, 25; Steven C. Harper, "Delawares and Pennsylvanians After the Walking Purchase," in *Friends & Enemies in Penn's Woods: Indians, Colonists, and the Racial Construction of Pennsylvania*, eds. William A. Pencak and Daniel K. Richter (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 167–79; Pennsylvania *Gazette*, Nov. 6, 1755; *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania*, vol. 6 (Harrisburg: Theo. Fenn & Co., 1851), 654, 659, 682–83.
18 Barr, "A Road for Warriors," 22–23; on the use of terror see also Kevin Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost: The Paxton Boy's and the Destruction of William Penn's Holy Experiment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 71; Crytzer, *War in the Peaceable Kingdom*, 64–66; and Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, 39–124.
19 Ibid, 50; John Heckewelder, *History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations Who Once Inhabited Pennsylvania and the Neighbouring States* (Philadelphia: Abraham Small, printer, 1819; reprint Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1876), 175–81, 215–19; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 1755; Denaci, "The Penn's Creek Massacre," 307–10; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Nov. 13, 20, 1755.
20 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 30, Nov. 6, 13, 20, 1755.
21 Crytzer, *War in the Peaceable Kingdom*, 98–99, 102–03, 169–97.
22 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 160–64; Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost*, 75; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Nov. 27, 1755, April 16, 1755; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 400.
23 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 524–25; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 133, 146–58, 161–66; *Pennsylvania Archives* Series 1, 3: 747–48; Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 186–217.
24 Merrell, *Into the American Woods*, 277, McConnell, *A Country Between*, 159–61, 181–82.
25 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 11, June 16, 30, 1763; John Armstrong and Thomas Wilson to Colonel Shippen, June 20, 1763, *Pennsylvania Archives* Series 1, 4: 108–9; Letters from the

Frontiers, *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania*, 9: 30; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 16, July 21, 28, Aug. 4, 1763; Gregory Evans Dowd, *War Under Heaven: Pontiac, The Indian Nations, & The British Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 129–31.

26 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 540–42, *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 16, July 7, 1763.

27 Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 542; A. T. Volwiler, "William Trent's Journal at Fort Pitt, 1763," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 11 (December 1924): 400; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Aug. 10, 1763; Merrell, *Into the American Woods*, 285; Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost*, 125–27.

28 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Oct. 16, 30, Nov. 6, 1755.

29 Crytzer, *War in the Peaceable Kingdom*, 53–57, 77–87. For Franklin's authorship of the Assembly's replies to the Governor see *PBF* 6: 193–210, 238–44, 249–66, 287–90. On the wagon correspondence, see ibid, William Shirley to Franklin, Sept. 17, 1755, 190–91; Franklin to John Hunter, Oct. 16, 1755, 223–24; Franklin to William Johnson, Oct. 16, 1755, 224; Franklin to William Shirley, Oct. 23, 1755, 227; William Alexander to Franklin, Nov. 12, 1755, 244–45; on Franklin's authorship of the spending and militia bills, and the unusual nature of single authorship, see ibid, 266–73.

30 Spero, *Frontier Country*, 121–22; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Nov. 6, 13, 20, 1755; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 158–60; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 166–67; *Boston Gazette*, Dec. 1, 1755; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Nov. 27, 1755; Crytzer, *War in the Peaceable Kingdom*, 77–87.

31 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Nov. 13, 1755; *Boston Gazette*, Nov. 17, 1755; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Nov. 13, 20, 27, 1755; "An Act for the better Ordering," *PBF* 6: 269–73; Franklin's Commission see Franklin to William Parsons, Dec. 3, 1755, ibid, 290–91, and ibid, 342–48.

32 Robert Morris to Captain Isaac Wayne, Jan. 3, 1756, *PBF*, 6: 349; Franklin to Morris, Jan. 14, 1756, ibid, 357–60; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Nov. 27, 1755, Jan. 6, 13, 20, 27, 1756; on the history of the construction of these fortifications, see William A. Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753–1758* (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Museum and Historical Commission, 1960).

33 Crytzer, *War in the Peaceable* Kingdom, 101–3, 110–15, 146–47; Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*, 161–65; Declaration of War, *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania* 7: 88–90; Civilian Scalp Bounty, ibid, 7: 78–79; Franklin celebrated the abdication of the "Stiffrumps" from the Assembly in a letter to Peter Collinson, June 15, 1755, *PBF* 6: 456–58.

34 On the frontier violence unleashed by the war and the scalp bounty, see Matthew Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754–1765* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 57–90.

35 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Oct. 9, 1755; Volwiler, "William Trent's Journal," 390–413; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 9, 1763; Franklin to Richard Jackson, June 6, 1763, *PBF* 10: 273–74; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 16, 30, July 7, 1763; Franklin to Richard Jackson, June 27, 1763, *PBF* 10: 295–97; Peter Collinson to Franklin, Aug. 23, 1763, ibid, 331–33.

36 *Boston Gazette*, Aug. 8, 1763; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, July 28, 1763.

37 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Aug. 4, July 21, Aug. 18, 1763; Merrell, *Into the American Woods*, 285; Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost*, 125–37.

38 *Pennsylvania Journal & Weekly Advertiser*, Dec. 29, 1763.

39 Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost*, 130–204; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Feb. 9, 1764; Benjamin Franklin, *A Narrative of the Late Massacres, in Lancaster County, of a Number of Indians, Friends of this Province, By Persons Unknown. With some Observations on the same* (Philadelphia: David Hall, printer, 1764).

40 Spero, *Frontier Country*, and idem, *Frontier Rebels: The Fight for Independence in the American West* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2018).

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