

The district court’s contrary conclusion (Dkt. 672 at 43-50) relied on a flawed textual analysis, namely, that the term “official” in Section 533(1) does not include “officers.” But the term “official” readily encompasses officers. *See Black’s Law Dictionary* (defining official, *inter alia*, as a “person elected or appointed to carry out some portion of a government’s sovereign powers”) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court’s opinion in *Lucia v. S.E.C.*, 585 U.S. 237 (2018), illustrates that point by stating that “[t]he Appointments Clause of the Constitution lays out the permissible methods of appointing ‘Officers of the United States,’ a class of government *officials* distinct from mere employees.” *Id.* at 241 (emphasis added). Many other cases employ the same usage of “official.” *See, e.g., Ortiz v. United States*, 585 U.S. 427, 452-53 (2018); *Morrison v. Olson*, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988); *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 131 (1976) (per curiam); *United States v. Eaton*, 169 U.S. 331, 343-44 (1898). And interpreting “officials” in Section 533 to include officers does not contradict Congress’s use of the term “officer” in other statutes. Rather, as *Lucia* suggests, “official” is a generic term that most naturally covers both officers and employees, *see In re Grand Jury Investigation*, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 644; *see also, e.g.,* 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (“public official” includes “an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the