statutory analysis was a "necessary step[]" to the Supreme Court's "ultimate conclusions," it is therefore an "authoritative" holding of the Court, not dicta. *United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC*, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598, 623 (D.D.C. 2018); *cf. Rudolph v. United States*, 92 F.4th 1038, 1045 (11th Cir. 2024) (judicial statements that are neither a "holding" nor "necessary to the holding" are dicta) (quoting *United States v. Gillis*, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)); *United States v. Files*, 63 F.4th 920, 929 (11th Cir. 2023) (dicta includes "legal conclusions predicated on facts that aren't actually at issue," "aside-like statements about irrelevant legal matters," and "statements regarding a legal framework that the court initially engages but ends up abandoning in favor of an alternative").

The district court relatedly suggested that *Nixon* is not binding because the Supreme Court "assumed" that the relevant appointment authority existed "without deciding it." Dkt. 672 at 54. But when the Court assumes antecedent issues, it specifically uses such qualifying language. *See, e.g.*, *Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.*, 144 S. Ct. 2440, 2450 n.2 (2024); *C.I.R. v. Idaho Power Co.*, 418 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (1974) (same court that authored *Nixon*). No such caveat appears in *Nixon* itself. *Nixon* did not rest on an assumption: it