

NOS. ~~DC-F202500751~~
~~DC-F202500752~~
~~DC-F202500753~~
~~DC-F202600200~~
 DC-F202600727

THE STATE OF TEXAS	§	IN THE 413TH DISTRICT
	§	
VS.	§	COURT OF
	§	
ADAM KING	§	JOHNSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE JOHN WEEKS

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW SHERIFF ADAM KING, Defendant in the above styled and numbered causes, by and through the undersigned Counsel, and moves the HONORABLE JOHN WEEKS be recused from presiding over the above-entitled and numbered causes, and in support of such motion shows:

I. **APPOINTMENT**

Judge John Weeks (hereinafter "Weeks") is the special presiding judge in the above matters pending in the 413th District Court of Johnson County, Texas having been appointed by the Hon. David Evans, Administrative Judge, 8th Administrative Judicial District.

II. **BACKGROUND**

The Defendant, Johnson County Sheriff Adam King, is presently indicted for the following offenses: (1) Corrupt Influence: Retaliation Against a Witness, (2) Corrupt Influence: Retaliation Against a Witness, (3) Abuse of Office: Official Oppression - Sexual Harassment, (4) Aggravated Perjury and (5) Tampering with Physical Evidence.

III. **WEEKS' BIAS AND PREJUDICE**

Weeks is biased and prejudiced against the Defendant, Sheriff Adam King. Judge Weeks presided over a previous jury trial in Cause No. DC-F202500752 from June 22 to July 7, 2026.

Weeks presided over this case and trial with a well defined agenda: to help the prosecution and try to convict Sheriff King at every opportunity. This trial resulted in a mistrial due the jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict. Judge Weeks' presiding over this previous trial revealed repeated instances of him demonstrating his bias and prejudice. Frankly, Weeks' rulings and decisions favored the State of Texas' position in almost every discretionary decision. Weeks treated the Defendant and Defense Counsel with generalized disdain and disrespect. Weeks was clearly the prosecution's judge and appeared to be there to help the prosecution's cause at every step of the trial.

IV. JUDICIAL BIAS

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized "judicial bias" as a grounds for legal disqualification in those cases in which the bias is shown to be of such a nature and to such an extent as to deny a defendant due process of law. *McClenan v. State*, 661 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).

Under Rule 18a Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, in order to recuse a judge, any party may file a motion stating why the judge should not sit on the case. The motion must be filed at least ten (10) days prior to the date set for trial or other hearing, must be verified, and must state with particularity the grounds for recusal. Rule 18b(2) provides various grounds for recusal, including cases where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned and when the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the subject matter or a party.

V. REASONS AND BASIS FOR RECUSAL ARE NUMEROUS:

The reasons and basis for recusal of Weeks are numerous:

1. WEEKS' WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE LAW REGARDING JURY SEPARATION

Cause No. DC-F202500752 was tried to a jury on June 22 to July 7, 2026. The jury was given the case for deliberations late on the afternoon of July 6, 2026. Late in the evening of July 6, Weeks announced that he was sending the jury home for the evening over the defense's objection which had not agreed for the jury to separate. Weeks announced that he knew it was

contrary to the law, but he was going to do it regardless because he did not have any way to accommodate the jury overnight except to put them in the care of the Sheriff's staff.

This was the Court's response:

And I have decided I'm going to send them home for the evening over the objection of the Defendant, and there is various reasons for that. I don't have anyone up here except Clint and a couple of other people.

Is that right, how many that you have here?

I don't have anyone, if I try to put them in a hotel, I don't have anyone to provide security for them or watch them, and so I have to then rely upon the department to do that of the - they're - the people who would do that are employees of the Defendant, and I don't feel comfortable doing that. Not that they would do anything, but I don't want to - I think it's a bad look. And the Jurors have expressed this.

And I understand it's over their objection, and I've never done this before over their objection, but I'm going to do it anyway. And if there is a finding of guilt, then they can have that issue on appeal, but I'm going to go forward and do it this way. Okay.

The defense objected fearing improper jury influence. Weeks went ahead and violated the law and sent the jury home for the night. Notably, Weeks charged the jury at 2:00 p.m. that day. Weeks even remarked "I'm willing to stay here until dark-30."

It is important that judges who preside over serious criminal litigation not purposefully disregard the law that they are sworn to follow. Such action by Weeks indicates a clear bias against the Defendant and in favor of the prosecution.

This knowing violation of the law deprived Sheriff King of a mandated right and a fair trial.

2. WEEKS' DISREGARDING FALSE REPRESENTATIONS AND PERJURY BY PROSECUTION

Cause No. DC-F202500752 was originally set for jury trial on May 18, 2026 by agreement of the parties. On May 12, 2026, the State of Texas filed a Motion for Continuance claiming that one of the State's witnesses, Dr. Michael Ellison who was designated by the State as an expert witness, was a **material** witness and would not be available as he was scheduled to be out of state on May 18. The prosecution claimed that Dr. Ellison would be in Utah "attending and hosting" a professional conference. The State even mentioned that the conference was "prepaid." Mr. Judd also represented in open court that the meeting with Dr. Ellison was "**in person**." The State's Motion was originally not sworn. Assistant District Attorney, Jason Judd, attributed that to a "clerical error" during the hearing. That representation by Judd is suspect in that the written motion contained patently false statements. However, Judd ultimately was caused to stand before Weeks and raise his right hand and swore out the Motion for Continuance in open court. As expected, Weeks granted the Motion for Continuance by the State.

Despite Judd's claim under oath that Dr. Ellison was a material witness for the State, Dr. Ellison unequivocally advised counsel for the defense that he never met Judd or the prosecution team prior to the continuance hearing. Dr. Ellison was subpoenaed by the defense for the trial in June 2026. Dr. Ellison contacted counsel for the defense prior to trial and advised that he "knows nothing of your case." Attached to this Motion is the email Dr. Ellison sent Matt Smid, counsel for the Defendant, after receiving his subpoena. Dr. Ellison requested a phone call and left his personal cell phone. Smid called Dr. Ellison. Ellison told Smid that he had not been retained by the prosecution and that he did not attend a professional (or any other) conference in Utah during the week of May 18, 2026. Dr. Ellison shared that in May 2026, he was contacted by Johnson County Assistant District Attorney, Stephanie Bosworth. Ms. Bosworth inquired if he could potentially share his expertise with her regarding an upcoming case and trial. Dr. Ellison told Ms. Bosworth that he would be leaving for Utah on May 16, 2026. Dr. Ellison said this was a pre-paid trip with his wife. Dr. Ellison and his wife take this personal trip every year to discuss and plan their upcoming year.

Prior to the continuance hearing on May 14, 2026, Dr. Ellison did not have any substantive conversations with Ms. Bosworth, or any member of the prosecution, about the case or his

expertise. Dr. Ellison had not informed Ms. Bosworth (or any member of the prosecution team) that he was willing to testify as an expert witness. He was not engaged in any manner as a witness or consultant. Dr. Ellison agreed to meet the prosecution team **in person, for the first time**, on **June 4, 2026** at his office in Arlington to have a substantive conversation and explore what exactly they were looking for from Dr. Ellison as a potential witness.

On June 4, 2026, twenty-one (21) days after the continuance hearing, Ms. Bosworth and her co-counsel arrived at Dr. Ellison's office around 1:00 p.m. for their scheduled meeting. Dr. Ellison said the co-counsel was a young man with dark hair and a slender build (presumably Judd). This was the first time Dr. Ellison ever met any member of the prosecution team **in person**. As the meeting progressed, it became apparent to Dr. Ellison that he could not be of assistance to the prosecution in any respect regarding their case and upcoming trial. He communicated that to them and never heard back from them.

Section 37.03 of the Texas Penal Code reads as follows:

37.03. AGGRAVATED PERJURY

(a) A person commits an offense if he commits perjury as defined in Section 37.02, and the false statement:

- (1) is made during or in connection with an official proceeding; and
- (2) is material.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.

It appears that Mr. Judd made false representations to the Court in writing, a clear violation of Rule 3.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. It also appears that Judd committed the offense of Aggravated Perjury in connection with the oral representations made in open court under oath on May 14, 2026. Defense counsel filed a Disclosure of Material Information to the Court on June 16, 2026 outlining that factual chronology and the false statements made by Judd to the Court both in written pleadings and in open court under oath. Interestingly, Judd responded in writing to that Disclosure without ever denying his false representations.

Weeks' lack of response to this information and this issue is truly unbelievable. Weeks did not convene a hearing on Judd's perjury, Weeks did not make any comment regarding this egregious conduct, and Weeks made no inquiry whatsoever regarding this egregious conduct.

Having been made aware that perjury had been committed in open court as part of an official proceeding, Weeks did absolutely nothing.

Weeks inaction sent a clear message to the State of Texas: the prosecution will be permitted to deceive the Court and others and there will be absolutely no consequences. For a court to tolerate and tacitly condone that kind of behavior by a lawyer is a clear indication that there exists a bias in favor of the State and against the accused.

3. WEEKS' DISREGARD OF PROSECUTION PURPOSEFULLY VIOLATING COURT ORDERS

Prior to trial, Weeks granted a Motion in Limine by the defense requiring the prosecution to approach the bench and determine admissibility of any extraneous offenses prior to seeking to introduce specific extraneous matters before the jury. The Court's ruling was clear and unambiguous.

On the second day of trial, Judd could not help himself. He stood up in the courtroom at a location six feet from the jury box, boldly defied the Court's order and knowingly **made a speech in the form of an objection advising the jury that there were two other indictments pending against Sheriff King**. Counsel for the defense objected and requested an instruction for the jury to disregard (that procedural requirement is required procedurally but is essentially worthless and ineffective). Weeks' response to Judd's egregious conduct was pitiful. He instructed the jury to disregard. He later issued a mild admonishment to Judd of "you should not have said that." That weak and almost hapless admonishment was administered outside the presence of the jury.

Weeks sent another clear message to the prosecution by his actions and tolerance: there will be no consequences from this Court/this Judge when you blatantly and openly defy the Court's rulings. Again, such action demonstrates a clear bias by Weeks in favor of the prosecution and against the accused.

4. WEEKS' COMMUNICATION TO THE JURY SIGNALING THE COURT'S DISPLEASURE WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OPENING STATEMENT

On June 23, 2026, both sides conducted opening statements to the jury. Weeks did not place a time limit on the opening statements. Counsel Mark Daniel made an opening statement on behalf of the Defendant. Almost twenty five minutes into his opening statement, Mr. Daniel was interrupted by Weeks inquiring "are you almost through, Mr. Daniel?" This comment was made before the jury and in a manner which conveyed to the jury the Judge's annoyance.

There was no legitimate reason for that comment by Weeks. This inquiry by Weeks was completely unnecessary and was designed to somehow communicate to the jury Weeks' displeasure with the defense. Again, such action demonstrates a clear bias by Weeks in favor of the prosecution and against the Defendant.

5. WEEKS' FAVORING THE PROSECUTION IN TIME ALLOTTED FOR FINAL ARGUMENT

Final arguments in the prior trial took place on June 6, 2026. The Court authorized forty-five (45) minutes per side for final arguments. Matt Smid, Attorney for Sheriff King, argued second for the defense. As Mr. Smid was concluding, he inadvertently exceeded his time by approximately two (2) minutes. No comment or admonishment was issued by the Court. The prosecution argued thereafter and Weeks allowed Ms. May's final argument to exceed the prosecution's allotted time by six (6) minutes, again with no comment or admonishment.

Two (2) does not generally equal six (6).

Again, Weeks continued to provide the prosecution with every conceivable advantage. Such indicates a clear bias in favor of the prosecution and against the accused. Notably, Mr. Smid requested fifty (50) minutes prior to the start of arguments. Without explanation, Weeks denied that request and only allowed forty-five (45) minutes.

6. WEEKS' UNLAWFUL EXPANSION OF JURY CHARGE TO ASSIST THE PROSECUTION

Weeks presided over a jury charge conference on July 6, 2026, much of which was informal discussion and occurred off the record. The prosecution had indicted the Defendant for the offense of Retaliation and adopted Chapter 554 of the Texas Government Code (the Texas Whistleblower

statute) in the indictment as the basis of the retaliation. “Personnel action” is defined in Chapter 554 of the Texas Government Code to include an employment “suspension.” However, the term “suspension” **was not alleged in the indictment**. During the informal charge conference and discussions on July 6, 2026, it became painfully apparent that the failure to have plead “suspension” in the indictment was most problematic legally and factually for the prosecution. This is now even more glaring and apparent as the prosecution has reindicted the case shortly after the trial and included the word “suspend” in the new indictment. Texas law is well settled that it is unlawful for a court to allow the prosecution to expand language of the indictment in the jury charge application paragraph. Weeks was well aware of that. However, Weeks came to the prosecution’s rescue and solved this problem for the State when he inquired of the prosecution: “are you willing to risk a two week trial by asking me to put this in here?” (referring to his inclusion of the word “suspension” in the jury charge). It was clear that Weeks was aware that the prosecution was not legally entitled to that instruction, but he was willing to help the prosecution in every manner possible, even if his assistance included unlawfully expanding the prosecution theory in the jury charge and risking reversal.

Weeks’ judicial decision in expanding the jury instructions to help the prosecution was such a radical departure from fundamental jurisprudence, accompanied by his comment, clearly establishes that there is no other logical explanation for such conduct by a sitting judge other than his clearly established role of helping and favoring the prosecution.

Such action by Weeks in knowingly expanding the jury charge by including prosecution theories in the jury charge that were not plead in the indictment demonstrates a clear bias in favor of the prosecution and against the accused.

7. **WEEKS’ REFUSAL TO INCLUDE LAWFUL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN JURY CHARGE IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE PROSECUTION**

Chapter 554 of the Texas Government Code expressly includes a statutory affirmative defense to retaliatory conduct. The defense provides that in the event the employing entity would have taken the action against the employee that forms the basis of the suit based solely on information, observation, or evidence that is not related to the fact that the employee made a report protected, such constitutes an affirmative defense. This affirmative defense was factually

supported by the evidence at trial and requested by the defense to be included in the jury charge. Weeks inquired of the prosecution's position to which they responded that it is a "civil defense" and should not be submitted to the jury. That might be true but for the fact that the prosecution based its accusation on the Texas Whistleblower Statute and had intricately woven Chapter 554 of the Texas Government Code (a civil cause of action statute) into the fabric of its indictment to support its allegation that King's retaliatory conduct was "unlawful." If the affirmative defense were to apply, then King's conduct would be deemed lawful. Weeks went out of his way to help the prosecution once again and made certain that the jury was not given the opportunity to even consider that defense by refusing to submit that affirmative defense to the jury.

For Weeks to exclude that statutory affirmative defense which inures to the benefit of the defendant once again demonstrates a clear bias by Weeks in favor of the prosecution and against the accused. The exclusion of the defense also denied Sheriff King of a fair trial and would have lead to a certain reversal had the jury convicted the Defendant.

8. WEEKS' BLATANT DISREGARD OF SCHEDULES OF DEFENSE COUNSEL

During the Motion for Continuance hearing on May 14, 2026 where Mr. Judd engaged in aggravated perjury, Weeks undertook to ascertain the respective upcoming schedules of counsel in an effort to prevent the trial from interfering with other obligations, summer vacation schedules and plans. Ms. May of the prosecution indicated that she had a trip to Hawaii scheduled in early June. Weeks was careful not to interfere with her trip as he scheduled a trial date. Mr. Daniel, representing the Defendant, advised Weeks that he had a personal trip scheduled for the week of June 22, 2026 but that he had "not incurred airfare expense" in connection with that trip (he was traveling by private aircraft). Mr. Daniel conceded on the record that he would comply with Court orders. Weeks promptly disregarded Mr. Daniel's plans and scheduled the trial for June 22, 2026. Weeks acted with utter disregard for the defense or defense counsel's personal schedule. This was done after he granted the State's request for continuance premised on false and perjurious representations.

Again, such discretionary action by Weeks demonstrates a clear bias in favor of the prosecution and against the defense.

9. WEEKS' FAVORING PROSECUTION IN RESPONSES TO JURY NOTES DURING DELIBERATIONS

The jury deliberated over two days (July 6-7, 2026) before announcing to the Court that deliberations would not result in a verdict. Several jury notes were sent out from the jury room certifying a disagreement in testimony by jurors and requesting to have testimony read back. Consistently, Weeks elected to read back to the jury only portions of testimony that the prosecution desired to have read back and repeatedly denied defense requests for the complete testimony on the topic to be read back.

Again, such actions by Weeks clearly violated the law and demonstrated a bias in favor of the prosecution and against the defense.

10. WEEKS' IMPOSITION OF SENSELESS AND ILLOGICAL BOND CONDITIONS

Weeks' imposition of bond conditions shows clear bias against the Defendant, Sheriff King. Weeks has fashioned bond conditions that deprive the citizens of Johnson County of a full time sheriff and chief law enforcement officer. Weeks previously imposed conditions wherein Sheriff King is only allowed to be present in his office on Monday, Wednesday and Friday of each week from the hours of 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Sheriff King is excluded from his own office at all other times.

Bond conditions mandated by Chapter 17 of the Texas Code of Criminal procedure are generally fashioned to protect the community and insure the accused's appearance at court proceedings. Chapter 17 includes specific conditions for certain types of offenses, none of which are included in the matters for which Sheriff King has been charged.

The three (3) day work week with time limitations effectively transforms Sheriff King into a part time employee for no legitimate reason. This condition is illogical and serves no purpose in protecting the community or insuring the Defendant's appearance in court. What conceivable difference does it make in community safety for the Sheriff to work five days a week rather than three? None, whatsoever. What conceivable difference does it make in community safety or insuring the Defendant's appearance in court for the Sheriff to possibly come in to work at 8:00 a.m. and/or stay until 5:00 p.m.? None, whatsoever.

These bond conditions imposed by Weeks are wholly illogical, nonsensical and serve no legitimate purpose. They have a singular purpose. They are meant to be punitive.

Again, such actions by Weeks clearly demonstrate a bias in favor of the prosecution and against the defense.

11. WEEKS' PURPOSEFUL REFUSAL OR DELAY IN RULING ON REQUESTED MODIFICATION OF BOND CONDITIONS

On July 29, 2026, the prosecution secured another indictment against Sheriff King in case no. DC-F20260027. The new indictment in Count 1 is simply a recapitulation of the previous charge of Retaliation but (1) corrects the spelling of Saulter's name and (2) adds the word "suspending" in an effort to correct the deficiency in the previous indictment. There is nothing new in Count 1.

Count 2 of this indictment in case no. DC-F20260027 includes an indictment of Tampering with Physical Evidence alleged to have occurred back in July of 2025 (more than a year before the accusation). This new accusation was brought by the prosecution notwithstanding that no one from law enforcement or the prosecution had requested the laptop and no data or history was deleted off the device.

Upon his surrender at the Johnson County Jail in case no. DC-F20260027, Sheriff King had bond conditions imposed that essentially prevent him from coming to work any day of the week at any hour.

Counsel for Sheriff King submitted a Motion to Adopt Bond Conditions Set in Other Pending Cases to this new charge on August 5, 2026. Counsel for Sheriff King has made two inquiries to the court coordinator of the 413th District Court to either schedule a hearing or have the Court make determination in this simple request. Both inquiries have received a response from the coordinator that "Judge Weeks is considering the Motion." Curiously, more than sixty (60) days have passed while Weeks' "considers" this motion. This causes one to wonder what it could be that possibly delays this "consideration" and prevents this judge from making a simple decision on a simple matter for a period of almost nine (9) weeks. It appears that Weeks simply wants to delay the decision in order to punish Sheriff King by keeping him from his office and making it impossible for him to serve the citizens of Johnson County. The delay borders on being ridiculous.

This action, or inaction, on the part of Weeks indicates a clear bias against Sheriff King and prejudice in favor of the prosecution.

**12. WEEKS' REFUSAL TO INVOKE THE ROLE OF WITNESS EXCLUSION
UPON REQUEST BY THE DEFENSE**

Counsel for the Defendant requested several times during the June 22-July 7, 2026 previous jury trial in this matter for Weeks to place witnesses under "the Rule" as required by Rule 614.T.R.E. Weeks responded to these requests stating that he was not going to do so and expected the lawyers themselves to properly admonish the witnesses regarding the requirements of the Rule.

Rule 614 T.R. E. provides that at a party's request the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear other witnesses' testimony. Rule 614 does not explicitly require a court admonishment that the witnesses are not to discuss testimony with each other. However, that is implicitly included with the exclusion requirement. Weeks chose to not even follow Rule 614 requiring an exclusion order from the Court. This admonishment from the Court was especially important in the trial of this case as most of the State's witnesses were kept in a courtroom together below the trial court room. The witnesses were people who knew and worked with each other, were friends, were parties to the same litigation and had a common agenda.

Such action by Weeks indicates a clear bias against the defense and in favor of the prosecution.

Again, it is imperative that the presiding judge follow the law in the trial of any accusation much less a complex and serious accusation.

**VI.
CUMULATIVE EFFECT AND
WEEKS' IMPARTIALITY REASONABLY QUESTIONED**

Each of these incidents of bias, standing alone, establish Weeks' favoritism for the prosecution and his bias and prejudice against Sheriff King. The cumulative effect of his conduct toward the Defendant and defense counsel overwhelmingly establish Weeks' bias and calls into question his impartiality. Weeks' bias against the defense and his agenda to help the prosecution during trial was something that could not be hidden from the casual courtroom observer.

The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should not preside over a proceeding in which the Judge's impartiality might be reasonably questioned.

VII.
PRAYER

The Defendant respectfully prays that the Court grant this Motion and that Judge Weeks recuse himself or forward this matter for consideration by the Presiding Judge of the Eighth Administrative Judicial District and a hearing be held at which time the Defendant may present evidence in support of this Motion for Recusal. Texas. R. Civ. P. 18a-18b governs recusal of judges.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Matthew J. Smid

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/s/Mark G. Daniel

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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion was delivered to the Johnson County District Attorney's Office, Cleburne, Texas on this 13th day of October 2026.


/s/Mark G. Daniel

MARK G. DANIEL


THE STATE OF TEXAS


COUNTY OF TARRANT

BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, on this day personally appeared MATTHEW J. SMID, who acknowledged to me that he has read the foregoing Motion for Recusal of Judge John Weeks, that he has personal knowledge of the events stated therein and the recitations contained in the Motion are true and correct.


MATTHEW J. SMID

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE this the 12th day of October, 2026.




Notary Public, State of Texas
My Commission Expires: 11/07/2029


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
COUNTY OF TARRANT

BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, on this day personally appeared MARK G. DANIEL, who acknowledged to me that he has read the foregoing Motion for Recusal of Judge John Weeks, that he has personal knowledge of the events stated therein and the recitations contained in the Motion are true and correct.


MARK G. DANIEL

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE this the 12th day of October, 2026.




Notary Public, State of Texas
My Commission Expires: 11/07/2029

AFFIDAVIT FOR MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE JOHN WEEKS

THE STATE OF TEXAS


COUNTY OF TARRANT

BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, on this day personally appeared SHERIFF ADAM KING, who acknowledged to me that he has read the foregoing Motion for Recusal of Judge John Weeks, that he has personal knowledge of the events stated therein and the recitations contained in the Motion are true and correct.

Adam King

SHERIFF ADAM KING

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE this the 12th day of October, 2026.



Teresa M Peets

Notary Public, State of Texas

My Commission Expires: 11/07/2029

Matt Smid

From: Michael Ellison <mellison@txwes.edu>
Sent: Monday, June 15, 2026 10:34 AM
To: Matt Smid
Subject: Subpoena (Texas v. Adam King)

Hello Mr. Smid,

This is Mike Ellison, please call me at your convenience regarding this case. I haven't prepared anything, have nothing to bring to court, and know nothing of your case.

Thank you,
-Mike

Michael Ellison, PhD, LPC-S
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Teri Peets on behalf of MARK DANIEL

Bar No. 5360050

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Status as of 10/14/2026 2:05 PM CST

Associated Case Party: State of Texas

Name	BarNumber	Email	TimestampSubmitted	Status
Tim Good	24051053	efileda@johnsoncountytexas.org	10/13/2026 3:21:46 PM	SENT

Associated Case Party: AdamR.King

Name	BarNumber	Email	TimestampSubmitted	Status
Matthew JSmid	24063541	matt@mattsmidlaw.com	10/13/2026 3:21:46 PM	SENT