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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION

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APPLICATION OF

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY CASE NO. PUR-2026-00056

For approval of a rate adjustment clause pursuant to
§ 56-585.1 A 4 of the Code of Virginia

FINAL ORDER

On May 1, 2026, Virginia Electric and Power Company d/b/a Dominion Energy Virginia ("Dominion" or "Company"), pursuant to § 56-585.1 A 4 ("Subsection A 4") of the Code of Virginia ("Code") and 20 VAC 5-204-5, 20 VAC 5-204-10, 20 VAC 5-204-60, and 20 VAC 5-204-90 of the Rules Governing Utility Rate Applications and Annual Informational Filings of Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, 20 VAC 5-204-5, *et seq*., filed an application ("Application") with the State Corporation Commission ("Commission") for approval of a revised increment/decrement rate adjustment clause ("RAC") designated as Rider T1, for an adjustment to the Company's recovery of costs under Subsection A 4, currently being recovered through a combination of the Subsection A 4 component of base rates and the current Rider T1.

Subsection A 4 deems to be reasonable and prudent, among other things, the "costs for transmission services provided to the utility by the regional transmission entity of which the utility is a member" and "costs charged to the utility that are associated with demand response programs approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [("FERC")] and administered by the regional transmission entity of which the utility is a member."

The Company has been a member of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("PJM"), a regional transmission entity that has been approved by FERC as a regional transmission organization, since 2005.[1] Dominion, as an integrated electric utility member of PJM, obtains transmission service from PJM and pays PJM charges for such service at the rates contained in PJM's Open Access Transmission Tariff approved by FERC.[2] The Company stated that it also pays PJM charges for costs associated with demand response programs approved by FERC and administered by PJM.[3]

In this proceeding, Dominion sought approval of a revenue requirement for the rate year September 1, 2026, through August 31, 2027 ("Rate Year").[4] This revenue requirement, if approved, would be recovered through a combination of base rates and a revised increment/decrement Rider T1. Rider T1 is designed to recover the increment/decrement between the revenues produced from the Subsection A 4 component of base rates and the new revenue requirement developed from the Company's Subsection A 4 costs for the Rate Year.[5]

The total proposed revenue requirement to be recovered over the Rate Year is $1,538,974,037, comprising an increment Rider T1 of $998,533,997, and forecast collections of $540,440,040 through the transmission component of base rates.[6] This total revenue requirement represents an increase of $206,899,352 compared to the revenues projected to be produced during the Rate Year by the combination of the base rate component of Subsection A 4

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[1] Ex. 2 (Application) at 4.

[2] *Id*.

[3] *Id*. at 5.

[4] *Id*. at 1.

[5] *Id*. at 6.

[6] *Id*.; Ex. 4 (Wilkinson Direct) at 2.

(the Company's former Rider T) and the Rider T1 rates currently in effect.[7] Implementation of the proposed Rider T1 on September 1, 2026, would increase the total monthly bill of a typical residential customer using 1,000 kilowatt-hours per month by $2.90.[8]

In Case No. PUR-2025-00058, the Commission directed the Company, in its next filing pursuant to Code § 56-585.1 A 4, to develop and propose alternative cost allocations for the purpose of examining transmission cost allocation.[9] The Commission further directed that one alternative shall be a modified Average & Excess model that incorporates principles from a six-month (or higher) coincident peak allocation methodology.[10] In response to this directive, the Company addressed, among other things: (i) the requested alternative cost allocation methodologies; (ii) the impact of such methods on the GS-5 rate class; and (iii) whether there are any additional considerations impacting transmission rates of return, especially for the GS-4 and GS-5 classes, beyond allocation methodology.[11]

On May 11, 2026, the Commission issued an Order for Notice and Hearing ("Procedural Order") in this proceeding that, among other things, docketed the Application; established a procedural schedule; directed Dominion to provide notice of its Application to the public; provided interested persons an opportunity to comment on the Application or participate in the

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[7] Ex. 4 (Wilkinson Direct) at 2. "The requested total revenue requirement in this Application of $1,538,974,037 represents an increase of $195,638,302 from the total revenue requirement approved for recovery in Case No. PUR-2025-00076." *Id.*

[8] Ex. 6 (Caffall Direct) at 8.

[9] *Application of Virginia Electric and Power Company for a 2025 biennial review of the rates, terms and conditions for the provision of generation, distribution and transmission services pursuant to § 56-585.1 A of the Code of Virginia*, Case No. PUR-2025-00058, 2025 S.C.C. Ann. Rept. 521, 527-528, Final Order (Nov. 5, 2025).

[10] *Id.* at 528.

[11] Ex. 7 (Miller Direct) at 3.

proceeding as a respondent by filing a notice of participation; scheduled public witness and evidentiary hearings; directed the Staff of the Commission ("Staff") to investigate the Application and file testimony and exhibits containing its findings and recommendations thereon; and appointed a Hearing Examiner to conduct all further proceedings in this matter.

Notices of participation were timely filed by the Virginia Committee for Fair Utility Rates ("Committee"); Appalachian Voices ("APV"); Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft"); Old Dominion Electric Cooperative ("ODEC"); Piedmont Environmental Council ("PEC"); Amazon Data Services ("Amazon"); Sierra Club and the National Resources Defense Council (together as "Joint Respondents"); Google, LLC ("Google"); Stack Infrastructure, Inc. ("Stack"); Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives ("Association"); Loudoun County, Virginia ("Loudoun"); Scout Development, LLC ("Scout"); and the Office of the Attorney General's Division of Consumer Counsel ("Consumer Counsel"). The Commission received hundreds of public comments on Dominion's Application. On June 3, 2026, Dominion filed proof of notice as directed in the Procedural Order.

On June 11, 2026, respondent testimony was filed by Amazon, PEC, ODEC[12], APV, Google, Joint Respondents, Committee, and Scout. Staff filed the testimony of four witnesses on June 16, 2026. Dominion filed rebuttal testimony on June 30, 2026.

The public witness hearing was held on July 14, 2026,[13] followed immediately by the evidentiary hearing which also convened on July 14, 2026, and concluded on July 16, 2026. Counsel for Dominion, the Committee, APV, Microsoft, ODEC, PEC, Amazon, Joint Respondents, Google, the Association, Loudoun, Scout, Consumer Counsel and Commission

[12] ODEC filed the corrected testimony of witness Eric Dembek on July 9, 2026.

[13] Two public witnesses testified at the public witness hearing. Tr. 8.

Staff were in attendance.[14] As directed by the Commission, counsel for these parties delivered closing arguments at the end of the proceedings.

On July 20, 2026, APV, Microsoft, PEC, the Committee, ODEC, Amazon, and Dominion filed post-hearing responses to Commissioner Bagot's questions posed to the parties during the proceedings.

NOW THE COMMISSION, upon consideration of this matter, is of the opinion and finds as follows.[15]

Revenue Requirement

The Company's Application filed in this proceeding proposed a total Rider T1 revenue requirement of $1,538,974,037,[16] of which $598,621,989[17] is to be collected in base rates and $940,352,048[18] collected through Rider T1 during the Rate Year. The Commission recognizes that approval of this uncontested revenue requirement will increase monthly bills paid for by virtually all customers.[19] Pursuant to the language of Subsection A 4, the costs that are the subject of this Application are "deemed reasonable and prudent," including the Company's return on investment, which is set by FERC; the Commission is without discretion to add or subtract from these costs.

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[14] Stack was excused from participating at the hearing. Loudoun County was excused following opening statements.

[15] The Commission has fully considered the evidence and arguments in the record. *See also Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County v. State Corp. Comm'n*, 292 Va. 444, 454 n.10 (2016) ("We note that even in the absence of this representation by the Commission, pursuant to our governing standard of review, the Commission's decision comes to us with a presumption that it considered all of the evidence of record.") (citation omitted).

[16] Ex. 2 (Application) at 6.

[17] This is an increase from the $540,440,040 proposed in the Application. *See* Ex. 28 (Caffall Rebuttal) at 2.

[18] This is a decrease from the $998,533,997 proposed in the Application. *Id.*

[19] *Id.* at Sch. 6.

Revenue Requirement Allocation Methodology

The Commission approves the amended 12-CP allocation methodology, as fully described and updated in the Company's rebuttal case, for the purpose of allocating costs in Rider T1 during the Rate Year. This methodology enjoyed support from diverse perspectives including Staff, the Company, the Committee, and Consumer Counsel.[20]

The amended 12-CP allocation methodology includes two key changes. First, the amended 12-CP allocation methodology includes a forecast adjustment to align the customer class level allocation determinants with the expected customer billing units for the Rate Year.[21] As explained by the Company, with rapid year-over-year expected growth in large-load customers, this adjustment results in comparably lower rates for non-large-load customer classes.[22] Second, the amended 12-CP allocation methodology includes a minimum demand adjustment to the allocation factor used for this proceeding.[23] This adjustment applies the newly adopted minimum demand charges for large-load customers, with a minimum charge for transmission of 85% of a large-load customer's contract demand (for any customers whose actual usage does not exceed that threshold) beginning January 1, 2027.[24] In effect, the Company adjusted actual customer-level load to the 85% minimum demand threshold, which

[20] [Ex. 24 (Pratt) at 21 (Generally agreeing that "the 12 CP Methodology is a reasonable method for allocating the costs of Dominion's Transmission Facilities."); Ex. 27 (Miller Rebuttal) at 14 (Testifying that the Company continues "to recommend use of the 12 CP methodology with the proposed forecast adjustment for this proceeding[.]); Ex. 9 (Collins) at 2 (supporting "the 12 CP method to allocate transmission costs in this case."); Tr. 1101 ("Consumer Counsel's position is that at this time the prudent approach is to continue with the 12-CP method for now and to allow the picture to develop regarding the GS-5 minimum demand charges and their impacts to cost allocation.").

[21] Ex. 27 (Miller Rebuttal) at 16.

[22] *Id.*

[23] *Id.* at 22.

[24] *Id* at 19.

results in a significant adjustment to the allocation factor.[25] At the extremes, this minimum demand adjustment *decreases* the residential class's allocation factor by 2.84% and *increases* the GS-4 rate class's allocation factor by 4.33%.[26]

To illustrate the impact of the amended 12-CP allocation methodology using the current Rate Year, the Company originally projected a $2.90 monthly bill increase for a typical residential customer using 1,000 kWh.[27] As approved herein, the amended 12-CP allocation methodology reduces the projected Rider T1 monthly increase for such a residential customer by 67.5%—from $2.90 per month to $0.94 per month.[28]

Direct Assignment of Transmission Costs

Many Respondents and Staff advanced mechanisms in this proceeding through which certain transmission costs could be isolated and directly assigned to large-load customers. These costs fell into three categories: (1) "direct connect" facilities, which generally included transmission substations and associated infrastructure to interconnect a large-load customer to the grid; (2) supplemental projects (excluding direct connect facilities) caused by the interconnection of large-load customers; and (3) transmission backbone infrastructure development or upgrades, including Regional Transmission Expansion Plan projects, from which the large-load customers—among others—would benefit.

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[25] Ex. 17 (Nelson) at 31 ("Because GS-5 loads are growing at a rapid pace, not considering the minimum demand charge within cost allocation could significantly reduce the amount allocated to the class.").

[26] Ex. 27 (Miller Rebuttal) at 22.

[27] Ex. 20 (Knight) at 14.

[28] Ex. 28 (Cahall Rebuttal) at 3. This reduced monthly bill amount also includes the impact of returning choice customer adjustment to the forecast. *Id.*

Appalachian Voices' testimony supported "direct assignment to the customers whose growth is driving the need for [supplemental] projects" because "new supplemental projects to serve new customers or accommodate load growth have not been designed to widely benefit all ratepayers[.]"[29]

ODEC's testimony supported a process through which Dominion would "[d]irectly [a]llocate the cost of transmission facilities caused by large-load customers in the DOM Zone to large-load customers regardless of the customer's [electric distribution company ("EDC")] because Dominion is constructing the transmission facilities for all large-load customers in the DOM Zone."[30] ODEC further proposed that "[t]o ensure that the large-load customer pays for all the transmission facility costs it causes, the Commission should require the customer to pay for ongoing O&M costs associated with the transmission facilities the customer requires for service. This could be accomplished through an adjustment to the customer's NITS[31] charge, or another payment mechanism, to be determined in a new proceeding."[32]

PEC's testimony supported "direct assignment of transmission costs for certain M-3 supplemental transmission projects including (1) substations and (2) upstream supplemental transmission projects required to connect the substations to the backbone high voltage system and any required upgrades to resolve harm identified either internally by Dominion Transmission or through a [do no harm] analysis."[33] PEC recommended that certain but-for "costs of the

[29] Ex. 10 (Goggin) at 35.

[30] Ex. 13 (Miller) at 14.

[31] Network Integration Transmission Services.

[32] Ex. 11 (Dembek) at 12.

[33] Ex. 14 (Abbott) at 37-38.

supplemental transmission infrastructure be directly assigned to the retail Large-Load data center customer(s) that require the infrastructure and collected from these customers through the payment of [a contribution in aid of construction ("CIAC")]."[34]

The Joint Respondents' testimony identified tiers of transmission and distribution infrastructure associated with connecting large load customers.[35] With respect to the transmission function, Joint Respondents supported requiring a CIAC, with a refund mechanism, for all costs from the large-load customer's meter to the transmission backbone.[36]

Amazon's testimony supported allowing large-load customers to make voluntary CIACs "as a way to reduce ratepayer burden."[37] Amazon recommended that a large-load customer electing such a voluntarily CIAC option "receive top priority in Dominion's interconnection queue."[38] Amazon disagreed with mandatory direct cost allocation proposals.[39]

Google's testimony supported a change to Dominion's existing line extension policy to enable large customers to voluntarily make a CIAC for substations, with ongoing maintenance costs being shared by the system.[40]

The Committee's testimony did not directly address direct assignment methodologies.

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[34] *Id.*

[35] Ex. 17 (Nelson) at 20.

[36] Ex. 17 (Nelson) at 21.

[37] Ex. 15 (Brooks) at 6.

[38] *Id.* at 14.

[39] *Id.* at 19.

[40] Ex. 18 (Berry) at 7.

Staff recommended Dominion be required to file proposed modifications to its line extension policy to provide for the cost recovery of transmission facilities through a net-of-revenue CIAC, if such facilities would not have been necessary, absent a customer's service connection, or service upgrade.[41] Staff identified numerous unresolved issues if Dominion's line extension policy were amended to allow for such CIACs.[42] In order to satisfy its statutory obligations, Staff asserted that the Commission could issue an order determining Rider T1 rates and direct further proceedings, in the instant case docket, for the receipt and consideration of proposed line extension policy modifications.[43]

Dominion did not favor direct assignment and took the position that it would be prudent for the Commission to allow the new minimum demand charge structure and current cost allocation methodology to mature before directing any further substantial changes to the transmission cost recovery framework.[44] In the event that the Commission desired to consider direct assignment in the immediate term, the Company provided two pathways forward. The Company's preferred option is direct assignment of costs to the newly created GS-5 class, or appropriate cooperative/other EDC, in situations where the Commission in a respective transmission CPCN proceeding has determined that some or all of the need for the project is being driven by a GS-5 or similar cooperative/other EDC customer.[45] The Company's second

[41] Ex. 24 (Pratt) at 28.

[42] *Id.* at 29-30.

[43] *Id.* at 28-29.

[44] Ex. 25 (Hines Rebuttal) at 3.

[45] *Id.* at 7-9.

alternative is for direct assignment of costs to the triggering customer, as opposed to the class, through an ongoing facilities charge over the life of the customer's contract.[46]

At the hearing, the Company, Respondents, and Staff generally agreed that if the Commission were to pursue direct assignment of certain transmission costs, supplemental proceedings would be needed.[47] Accordingly, the Commission will establish a docket forthwith for that purpose, with certain parameters defined below:

Dominion's Terms and Conditions for Electric Line Extensions and Installations

The record in the current case supports directing Dominion, after coordinating with Staff,[48] to file for the approval of amendments to the Company's existing line extension policy that would require a mandatory CIAC for defined types of transmission facilities. The Company is directed to file, in the new docket to be established by the Commission, a proposed amended line extension policy within 90 days from the date of this Final Order. The Commission provides below parameters that shall be reflected in the amended line extension policy, with the understanding that some refinements and additional consideration may be necessary.

Under Dominion's existing line extension policy, projected customer revenue is used to determine a "revenue credit," which is applied against the capital expenditures incurred by Dominion to construct and install certain new or expanded distribution facilities to serve the

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[46] *Id.* at 9.

[47] *See e.g.*, Ex. 25 ("Hines Rebuttal") at 16 (Recommending that "broader questions of transmission cost recovery and cost allocation from large-load customers [occur] in a separate future proceeding . . . ."); Ex. 24 (Pratt) at 28 ("Staff believes that the Commission could issue an order determining Rider T1 rates and direct further proceedings, in the instant case docket, for the receipt and consideration of the Company's proposed line extension policy modifications."); Tr. 969, 973, 1086, 1091, 1015-1016, 1025, 1044, 1055, 1059, 1098.

[48] Staff identified a number of outstanding questions in the event that the Commission directed amendments to Dominion's line extension policy. Ex. 24 (Pratt) at 29. The Company and Staff are directed to consider these questions in its coordinated efforts and Dominion is directed to address these questions when filing its amended line extension policy.

customer.[49] The remaining amount of capital expenditure, net of this revenue credit, is then charged to the individual customer through a CIAC.[50] Dominion is directed to follow a similar net-of-revenue approach[51] for certain capital expenditures, defined below, incurred by Dominion to install new or expanded transmission facilities to serve large-load customers. However, the revenue used to determine the amount of the mandatory CIAC shall be limited to revenues expected to be produced by a customer's transmission charges.

The Commission clarifies that such a change to the line extension policy is to apply prospectively and only to "direct connect"[52] transmission facilities—generally meaning substations and the lines connecting the customer to the bulk transmission system—that are needed to serve new or expanding large-load customers (in these instances the large-load customer would be the but-for cause of the "direct connect" transmission facilities).

The record established that there is a relationship between mandatory CIACs and the risk addressed by collateral requirements recently approved for certain large-load customers.[53] The Commission directs the Company, in coordination with Staff, to consider how the mandatory CIAC can be used to offset or reduce collateral requirements in an equitable manner.

Direct Assignment of Additional Transmission Costs

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[49] Ex. 24 (Pratt) at 24.

[50] *Id.*

[51] If warranted, the Commission would consider a varying benchmark multiple for continuing estimated annual revenue.

[52] The record in this proceeding sketches a definition of "direct connect" facilities to include: substations and lines, Tr. 551, and other transmission infrastructure that is necessary to connect the large-load customer to the bulk transmission system. Tr. 505, 582-589. Dominion, in coordination with Staff, is directed to propose an explicit definition of "direct connect" facilities when it files the amended line extension policy.

[53] *See., e.g.*, Tr. 364 (PEC Witness Abbott testifying that a "CIAC would completely eliminate all risk [of stranded costs] going forward. So it would still be better than the collateral requirements.").

The Commission recognizes that a line extension policy addressing "direct connect" transmission facilities may not address all instances in which a utility may incur transmission-related costs to address transmission system reliability criteria violations that appear to be directly caused by the addition of one or more large-load customers.[54] The Commission remains committed to ensuring a fair and reasonable—but not excessive—allocation of appropriate costs to large-load customers. To that end, the Commission may use the upcoming docket to also consider: (i) if the amended line extension policy described above could or should be extended to higher-order transmission costs;[55] (ii) a blended approach whereby the "direct connect" facilities are subject to the amended line extension policy described above while higher-order transmission costs (*e.g.,* supplemental project costs not covered by the line extension policy) are directly assigned to the GS-5 rate class;[56] or (iii) maintain the course with the amended line extension policy addressed herein.

The Commission recognizes that over the last two years it has explored and approved meaningful tariff reforms[57] (*e.g.*, creation of a new GS-5 rate class, and tariff provisions requiring collateral requirements, minimum demand charges, exit fees, and a 14-year term period),[58] all related to protecting legacy customers from the risks associated with connecting new large-load customers. The tariff reforms approved, and those envisioned in the expanded

[54] *See e.g.,* Ex. 22; Tr. 665.

[55] Some parties recognized that the transmission system could benefit from more regional transmission planning—as compared to supplemental projects. *E.g.*, Ex. 10 (Goggin) at 17-18. To the extent that the Company has more of a financial incentive to avoid a CIAC, such an extension of the line extension policy to include supplemental projects could drive more regional planning.

[56] Ex. 25 (Hines Rebuttal) at 7.

[57] Tr. 1041.

[58] Tr. 1047.

line extension policy, are a reflection of the imposing risks that *could be* realized through the sudden influx of new singularly large customers. The Commission also recognizes the *potential* rate benefits associated with such an increased number of billing determinants over which to spread system costs.

While the current record supports a more rapid approach towards direct assignment of costs through a CIAC for "direct connect" facilities, the Commission finds that the record supports a more deliberate approach to the question of direct assignment of higher-order transmission costs. The Commission acknowledges that many of the recent tariff reforms, including the expanded line extension policy envisioned in this Final Order, will require some period of time before impacts can be fully understood and any benefits realized. In addition, the Commission is aware that FERC is considering reforms that may overlap or duplicate efforts already being implemented at the state-level.[59] Nonetheless, within the Commission's jurisdictional line of authority, if existing or new tariff reforms prove to be insufficient, the Commission retains the tools necessary to make appropriate adjustments.

Mutual Operating Agreements

As identified in the Committee's Post-Hearing filing addressing potential jurisdictional limits of the Commission in creating a CIAC mechanism for certain supplemental projects, "FERC has squarely addressed areas where states have exclusive jurisdiction: 'states retain exclusive authority over the specific terms of retail sales and retail rate design, including how the costs of interstate wholesale sales and transmission of electricity assigned to a wholesale

[59] *See e.g.*, Committee Post-Hearing Letter Response at 2.

customer are allocated *among that* wholesale customer's retail customers.'"[60] To this point, in this Final Order the Commission has addressed the allocation or assignment of the DOM Load Serving Entity's ("LSE") portion of DOM Transmission Zone wholesale transmission costs *among* Dominion LSE retail customers,[61] which is consistent with the above quote from FERC explaining its understanding of jurisdictional boundaries. The record is less clear that the Commission has the exclusive jurisdiction to allocate the DOM LSE's portion—or another EDC's portion—of DOM Zone wholesale transmission costs among customers that are not DOM LSE's retail customers, especially in the context of a rate proceeding for Dominion LSE's retail customers. In fact, ODEC's own testimony in this proceeding implies FERC's jurisdiction over this issue and the potential for additional proceedings.[62]

Accordingly, the Commission finds that such issues between various DOM Zone wholesale customers should be addressed in the context of the existing Mutual Operating Agreements ("MOA") on file with FERC. Dominion states that these MOAs set forth the terms and conditions to connect and operate facilities and coordinate planning with the Company's interconnecting wholesale transmission customers.[63] The Company further represents that the MOAs address cost allocation for Delivery Point establishment and allocate costs to each party when such modifications are required.[64]

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[60] Committee Post-Hearing Letter Response at 1 (citing *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.*, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217) (cleaned up).

[61] *See e.g.,* Ex. 24 (Pratt) at 10.

[62] Ex. 11 (Dembek) at 12; Ex. 13 (Miller) at 3.

[63] Dominion Post-Hearing Brief at 6-7; *See also* Ex. 13 (Miller) at 3.

[64] Dominion Post-Hearing Brief at 7.

To be clear, the Commission recognizes that potential issues exist regarding fair assignment of costs when a large-load customer in one LSE/EDC creates costs for customers in a different LSE/EDC[65]—an equity issue that can go in both directions.[66] It is apparent, however, that a legally durable solution would be promoted through coordination with FERC's established process. Accordingly, Dominion is directed to work with ODEC, and any other necessary EDCs, with the goal of finding an acceptable and symmetrical approach towards assigning costs in these circumstances and to file a status update with the Commission within 120 days from the date of this Final Order.[67]

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) Rider T1, as approved herein, shall become effective for service rendered on and after September 1, 2026.

(2) The Company forthwith shall file, with the Clerk of the Commission and the Commission's Divisions of Public Utility Regulation and Utility Accounting and Finance, the updated tariff sheets for Rider Tl as approved herein.

(3) The Company is directed to file, after coordinating with Staff, in a separate docket to be established by the Commission forthwith, proposed amendments to the Company's existing line extension policy as described herein. The Company is directed to file its proposed amended line extension policy within 90 days from the date of this Final Order.

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[65] *See generally* Ex. 10 (Mara).

[66] Ex. 25 (Hines Rebuttal) at 13-15.

[67] *See id.* at 16 ("To the extent so directed, the Company is willing to continue discussions with stakeholders to determine if there can be agreement on a direct assignment protocol for supplemental transmission project costs, and to engage with other EDCs in the DOM Zone and undertake any necessary filings at the FERC to implement any directives of the Commission along these lines.").

(4) The Company is directed to file, after working with ODEC, and any other necessary EDCs, with the goal of finding an acceptable and symmetrical approach towards assigning costs in these circumstances, a status update with the Commission within 120 days of the date of this Final Order, also in the separate docket to be established forthwith.

(5) This case is dismissed.

A COPY hereof shall be sent electronically by the Clerk of the Commission to all persons on the official Service List in this matter. The Service List is available from the Clerk of the Commission.